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PREFACE 
Few men who have crossed the acene ot American history have lett such a 
lasting impression as has Theodore Roosevelt. He is remembered for the maJ17 
historic events in which he pla7ed a part, often as the central figure. Among 
these was his mediation at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to discuss Theodore Roosevelt's m0-
tives for becoming involved in this seemingly Far Eastern affair as well as 
the results of his mediation. In figuring ctUt his motives we shall see Roose-
velt in action, and also we shall see the significance of many of the eventa 
of the past half-century. 
Somewhat antecedent to the central part of the thesis will be a brief 
discussion of the world situation and background at the beginning of the War. 
The heart of the thesis, however, will be unfolded in studying Roosevelt's ac-
tual part as mediator in the Portsmouth Conference and the motives behind his 
mediation. Another perspective will be gained from considering Roosevelt's 
professed foreign policy as part and parcel of his mediation work with the 
Russians and the Japanese at Portsmouth. The crucial questions that are to be 
answered are these I were his peacemald.ng efforts and his policy successes or 
not. and wbat is the real significance or Roosevelt's Portsmouth work. In 
this respect Roosevelt has been judged and rejudged with contradictory results. 
At first many thought that Roosevelt was eminently successful in his undertak-
ings. The next generation of critics reversed their predecessors' decision 
iii 
iv 
and judged Roosevelt a failure in every respect. Both verdicts were undoubt-
edly extremes. Theodore Roosevelt's success or failure was not 80 final a 
thing one way or the other. This thesis attempts to determine to what degree 
Roosevelt did succeed with his policy and its implementation at Port8lltouth in 
the summer or 1905. 
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CHAPrER I 
THE BACKGROUND, THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSo-JAPANESE 
WAR, ITS PROGRESS, AND EFFECTS 
In considering the part Theodore Roose"elt plllled at PortSllouth, it is 
..... tial to have some understanding ot the European situation and European 
intere.t. in the Far East at the time. and a brief look at American Asiatic 
altairs will 'ollplete this important picture. 
It IIfIl be wondered why a conaideration:ot European and American interest. 
i. at all necessar", but the ne.e.sity will soon become evident when it ia 
.... just how much the European oountrie., as well as our own, had at stake 
in the 'ar lut. All the.e concerns and cldllS were endangered by the Ru •• o-
Japanese War. In couidering Europe we shall stress three countries in par-
ticular' I'rance, Germany. and England. Russia, ot course, will be discussed 
later. 
So now tor a quick look at how these three European nations stanel prior 
to the Russo-Japanese War, both in regard to their relations toward one anoth-
er and toward the belligerents, Russia and Japan. 
!he origins ot the Russo-Japanese War lie 1I0re in Europe than in 
Asia. Originally the contllct was between Russia and England. 
More t-ediately it was between Ge1'll&!l.1 and all the European states 
which stand in the path ot her ambitions. The war itself may tair-
ly be viewed as a SymptOIl of a world-wide disorder, the cODsequence 
ot which we know only too well. Japan, to be sure, was not without 
her national ambitions and they are not to be explained aw~ or 
charged wholly to Europe. But they were only a small part ot the 
causes of the war with Russia. • •• Not until we know the Euro-
1 
pe8l'1 backgroWld are we Ukel;r to appraise the immediate causes Of 
the war without assigning to them a disproportionate importance. 
As Dennett later points out, Europe used the Far East to maintain the 
2 
balance ot power. This precarious balance could no longer b. kept in a closed 
Europe, but the Far East otter.d virgin territory for the different cOWltries 
to claim as th.ir own and to pl..,. oft against one anoth.r.2 The various COWl-
tries. through the last halt ot the nineteenth century, had obtained "spheres 
of intluence" in China and other parts ot the Far East tor just this purpose. 
China and Japan came within the interests ot the European powers who had pit;r 
on the poor "savag.s" ot the Orient. France considered parts ot south China 
as h.r .p.cial sphere ot influ.nc., German;r:.xtended her orbit through the 
;rears; England delight.d in Hongkong and other areas. Debt., conc.ssion., 
tavors, all w.r. paid ott in Chin.se t.rritor;r. 
Th.s. COWltri.S worked th .... lv.s into a regular maze ot alliance. which 
tinall;r divid.d triend trom to. in the approaohing contUct. Franc. was the 
ally ot Russia; England and Japan signed their first alliance in 1902; German;r 
and Russia •• cretl;r joined ettort. in 1904; England and France headed into an 
agr.em.nt in the sam. year, Anglo-Russian etforts at rapport .tretched from 
1904 through 1907. Finall;r. at the outbreak ot the War, the chiet allies were 
France and Russia against England and Japan. Germany's two-taced role will be 
tr.ated later at greater length. 
To have alliances on paper is one thing, but the intentions b.hind such 
IT.Jler D.nn.tt, Roosevelt !as !h! Russo-Japanese ~t (New York, 1925>, 
2Ibid •• 51. 
, 
alliances are something different. No matter what an1 pact or agreement 881s, 
each country is looking out primarily for it.elf and its own advantage- For 
instance, in the ear17 1900's German7 was working to get Russia mired in a Far 
Eastern war so that Russian pressure would be taken off German7'S eastern 
nank. Kaiser Wilhel.lJl II thought that any peace between lbaasia and Japan 
would get Russia permanently .. eshed in the Far East. Iie also was working 
to keep England and France out of the War and from aJl7 further medcUing in 
the Far East. Thus Russia and Germany. or so' the Kaiser thought, would be 
able to ahare in the ultimate division of the "Middle Kingdom. ft 
While German7 was conniYing in her wat, Great Britain vas cOllSOlidat1ng 
her position in China and using her Chinese holdings as buffer states for her 
interests, particular17 in India. She was Pla7ing China againat Russia; but, 
when China showed herself powerless in the Sino-Japanese War ot 1894-1895. 
England vari17 turned to Japan as a possible. strong ally_ 
The United States, also. gradual17 became involved in the Far lut. In 
oonsidering the Far Eastem poliC7 of the United States it will be necesaaJ'7 
to consider it tor the present in the most general terms. Theodore Boose-
Telt's Teraion of American Far Eastem policy will be discussed in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
The United States torced her 11181 into China and Japan, and thus into 
Korea and Manchuria. As early as 1844 the United States opened negotiations 
with China and, nine years later, with Commodore Matthew PeJ'r7·. voyage to 
the East, Japan was opened to foreigners. In 1882 the United States signed 
a "good otfices" pact with Korea. Gradually these separate actiol'lS gaTe 
birth to the formulation ot some sort ot policy_ By the turn ot the century 
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at le .. t 110M otficlals were besinn! III to vUe up to the world role whioh the 
VId. te4 Stat .. wu ataniDg to JWl7. ~ a yer, tew _Y1a1oaed the future 
areatn ... ot aa 1IIperial United Statea, whUe moat Americana were .till fight-
tag the C1 ri.l War and arp1ag about the gold .taadard. Thelr yla101l wu oon-
t1Dad to thi. OO\Ult17. 1a taot, to thelr 0WIl .,er, local aitutiou. 
But 1a Vashi qtoa Allerica·. aft role vas aeen and \IIIderatood b, a tew ... 
auch .. Jolm IrQ. Al.trec1 Mahan, lIear7 Cabot Lodee. u.d 7O\IJL8 'fheoclore Rooae-
.. It. Ifq 1n1tiatecl the Vn.1ted State.' "OpeD, Door" pollC7 1a 1899, and he 
conti.ued. th:1a polio, ot atteapt1ag to get the Power. to agree to reapect and 
M1Dta1D. the territorial inteerlt, ot China. The.e "opeD. door" note. were 
weak a1aoe the, hacI no 11111 taI7 torc. OJ' _otl_ behind th ___ d ..,e17OD. 
)mew it. 1'he Allerioaa Pal" Eaatera pollo, cue to be .. e ot atreagthen1nc 
China while Europe oou1ved. at partitioa1ac Ch1D.a. This yerr partltiOll1Jag 
.. a _jor HU.1'Oe ot haJ'II to AIIencan co._cia! yeature. and other interest. 
1a the Far :r.at. !he cliridiDg .t the "middle ld.agdoatt would .... entual.l7 lead 
to the deetl'uotioa ot aD7thiJaa like a Chiae .. ution, but rather lt would "e 
out ot Cld.na a ho4p-poclp ot tomp. oolODiea. Vader such c1rCUll8tane.. the 
UAl ted States would Bot haM arq trade vi th a dJiag or dead Ch1aa and abe 
could Dot trade wi'" JUropefiPl nati~ who •• Chiao.. oolOJde. were 801e17 tor 
the b .. ent ot the IIOther-oounv,.. thwI, the tJn1ted Statea oould aot beo .. 
a part, to the d1vieioa ot 0h1aa, and abe triM to d.eted its integrit;r. 
iq, the I"&t cleteader 01 the Opea Door, expoaecl .erican policy along this 
line quite clearlY when he wrote fheedore RooseYtlt in 1902' "We are not in 
D1 attitude ot hostility towards auseia in Manchuria. On the contrary, we 
reoopi.. her excepticmal poai tion in northern China. What we haye be. work-
iDs tor two lears to aocomplish, it usuranCH are to count tor a.D7th1q, 18 
that, DO matter what !lappelUl nentuallJ' 1n northern Ch:i.Da and Manchuri.a. the 
Un1 ted. Stat .. shall DOt be placed. :1n M1 wor.. posi tiOll thAn while the countq 
vu wu1u the UDquest10aed dOld.n1cm ot China.,t3 Along v1 th S1no-Mano~an 
ute.,....tII the lJa1ted. State. vas expand1q her hol.c:l1ngs :1n the Caribbean, a 
the Pacific with the Bawaiio and. the Ph1l1ppine I&luda, and bl the construe-
t10n ot the Panama Canal. Later the atQrJ ot American atenats under '1'heo-
~re Boo.aT.lt will cont1.nue this picture ot the UD1ted Stat .. :1n the J'ar East. 
Blat first the major contestants a the taat-approaoh1ng eontlict, Russia 
and Japan, require special treatllent. !he best W8'3 to arrive at an understand-
1Dg ot Ruaao-Japan .. e relatioD8hips is to .ee their reapective attitudes and 
cHa1_ tovar4 'heir spheres of 1nfluence, Manchuria a:ncl Itorea, around the 
turD of the centUl'1. tor the.e 88IIe spheres of iJlfiuence would become the 
eee la!ll1 of the Ruuo-Japane .. War. 111e.e are .. grew in 1IIportanoe just 
after the I1no-Japaneae War ended. 
la the ,ear. tollov:iJ:'1c the S1no-Japaneae War Russia had all1ed her.eU 
vith China with the l'HUlt that abe came 1;0 control larS- .ectiona of Manchu-
ria. Cb1na cOll81derecl thi. ceas10n of ngh t. as o.nl.7 cover1ng busineas adld.a-
1atratioa. wbUe lusaia :1nterpreted the le .. e as g1v1q her tu.ll ciYU juris-
diction. la the Boxer lebell10n of-l900 All iatema.ticmal police force entered 
China v1 th the purpose of bringing relief to the foreign legat10u 1n Peld..Dc. 
whic. were beinc beaie ... bl the Boxer.. Of cour.e Ruasia was included in 
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this relief mission, but she prematurely withdrew her forces from Peking and 
stationed them, in large numbers. in Manchuria. Russia's goals seemed 
obv1ows--she wanted Manchuria. But her policy or method was not clear as 
two distinct and oppoa1ng factions were then begirm:i ng to taoe each other in 
the Ruse1an home 8OVel'DSllent. In 190' Serge Witte (who represented one aide 
of the Rwtld.an IOVel"lllHllt), the Minister of Finance, could write that the ab-
aorptioa ot a part of the Chine .. Empift vas cml.1 a _tt.r ot tille and "our 
chief a1a 18 to see that this abaorptiOl1 shall take plaoe natura.l.ly. without 
pncip1taUng evente, without taking premature st.pa, without seizing t.rri ... 
toZ7. in order to avoid a premature cU:rieion of Ch1n.a b7 Pow.rs concerned • ..4 
Oppoaed to Witte's policy of gradual and qui.t absorption ot Manchuria. a new 
sroup of aell were pilling the favor and the ear of the Czar. Their plaIl vaa 
to take over MaDebur1a and Korea qu1ckl.1' anel with toroe. if nHeeeal7. Uader 
the leadeNhip .t a man aae4 hllObnsOtt this a." tHtton \fall promot1ag Um-
bar 1at ..... ts and cOllcuaiou in the Yalu River Valle,. in !forth Korea. Soon 
Witte and his _ouates were to " forced trOll the soene and. the revo1utioa-
8Z"I tMUoa va.a to take over. Part ot the latter group·s plaa was pU.t into 
etteot when Alex.i.tt t the Russian oomaander in Manohuria. kept the Russian 
troops tJ"OIl the Pekiag mission in Manohuria, the bighWJq to Korea troa East 
Russia. tis aggressive poliO,. in Manohuria ud KoHa angered. all the Powers 
who teared for th.ir 0V1'l :t.aterests. 'but it particularly trightened Japan who 
reprde4 lena .. her verJ' special sphere of iJltlu8llCe. !he pre88Ul"e of the 
7 
other nations was so great that Russia, at last, had to agree to evacuate 
Manchuria, and she promised to do this by withdrawing her troops in install-
ments. This agreement of April 1902 would have aolved the problem, but Russia 
had added a condition--China must provide adequate administrative measures in 
Manchuria. Ruesia kept alleging that China was not keeping the agreement and 
the Czar kept adding new conditions. !'in~ it was evident that China could 
do little or nothing and so Japan interfered in order to maintain her inter-
ests in Manchuria and, particularly, in China. In July 1903 Japan began a 
.eries of negotiations with Russia over their mutual interests in Manchuria 
and Korea. Unknowingly Japan was fighting the divided counsels ot Witte and 
Bezobrazotf. 
But just wbJ ahould Japan have become so involved? Japan's interests in 
Manchuria have alrea~ been alluded to. Much more important than her inter-
eate in Manchuria wu Manchuria' s position as the highwq to Korea-and now 
Russia was threatening to control and isolate Manchuria from all comers. T::!is 
was an imIIediate threat to Korea ed Japan' s designa on that kingdom. Japan • 8 
concern with Korea was of much greater moment and much more vi tal than Rus-
sia's. Russia had expanded into Korea tor purely commercial reasons, while 
Jape deeperately looked to Korea as a country which could absorb eome of her 
exees. population. Japan also had commercial reasons, but more important to 
her was her abeolute need of Korean led. She must have predominant influ-
ence in Korea, but ehe feared that, if Korea would come under the domination 
of some other power, her own existence in the Japanese Isles would be endan-
gered. In 1898 Japan and Russia had come to a working agreement over the Ko ... 
rean situation with sach side firmly detending the territorial integrity of 
8 
Korea. Rwleia's eubsequent action canceUed preY10ua arrangements and Japan 
then opened negotiations with Ruaa1a in the auaaer of 1903. War wae not nec-
....n.l.7 1Dn'itabl., but soon • dangerous impuse was reached. ".Quasi. would 
admit Japan's poaition in Korea provided Japan would agree not to tortifJ the 
nortben border, but in Manchuria Russia would practically exclude Japanese 
in COIJIIOIl with all foreignera, ed Rusa1a would not renew the pledp to re-
8p8Ct the iate¢ t1 of China. uS 
later Japan practioally pined complete control and jurisdiction ot Korea 
through two atP'Mllenta aiped in 1904. In the meanUme Ruaaia was not unv111-
iDe to let Japan haYe a free hand in Korea it ehe would promise to stay out of 
Manchuria, but, ne1ther side would give in to the other. Japan did attempt to 
oome to u agreement, while Ruma .eemed to do nothing but delq the proceed.-
iDp and retlGi.ned 1atrans1gent OIl the status ot Manchuria, even to the point 
of retuaing to d.1SCUM it. In November 1903 Japall .. e Foreign. M1D1ster Kcmura 
_ed up the situation all tolloWIU 
'fhe Japane.. Government are prepare4 to adIIIi t that the Manchurian 
question, 80 lar .. it doea not alfect their right. and interesta. 
18 purely a Russo-Ch1a .. e question; but Japan baa extensive and 
important iIlte"." 111 that res1oa, and the Japane.e Govem.llMtnt 
think that in declar1Dg that Manchuria 18 outside their sphere 01 
.,..1al intereat, they .... at leut entitled to uk lor a correla-
tive engasemeat OIl the part of Rwsaia not to interlere with the 
ocamerc1al and rea1dent1al l"1gbts and. 1aInmit:l. •• belonging to Ja-
pan in Y1rtue 01 her tHaty enpgementa with Cb1aa.6 
Still neither aide would 11.1d, and t1nally all hope ot a peaceful settlement 
9 
seemed dashed when Witte, the head ot the pacitist wing in Russi., was torced 
to withdraw trom the government and hi. place was tilled b7 a member ot the 
war-aongering, commercial taction. l'inall7 Japan broke ott diplomatic rela-
tiona with .Ruaaia on Pebru&r7 5. 1904, notifying Rueeia that she would take 
whatever measures seem.d necesaarr to maintain her position and intereste. 
ti. cautiously worded. menage was all but a declaration ot war. Three da7s 
later war diel cOIle who Japan struck the Russian neet suddenl;y and unexpect-
ed.l;y at Port Arthur. On Februar;y 10 Japan tormal17 declared war. 
Apparentl;y eveJ70ne except the Czar and Jlueaia thought that the war was 
inevitable. As a contident ot Witte, and a man who moved in Ru.sian diplo-
_tic circle. tor ;years, baa said. "1 sa cdnvinced that the Tsar deemed him-
aelt to be what hi. toreian triends had proclaimed him, 'the mainsta;y ot the 
world's peace', and that 80 long as he was averse to war no other power would 
clare to risk it. rew men ot his temper .. ant who had been continually assured, 
as he had, that he was the Vicar ot God and. the recipient of special divine 
grace would have thought or felt much ditterently."? 
But the rest ot the world was much more realistic while being pred.omi-
BIUltly pro-Russian, in the senee ot expecting Russia to win and win quickly! 
'-he French publicatioD, l4 Verit/rrancais., echoed the thought ot much ot 
the western world when it wrote: "God .cannot do otherwise than give victoJ7 
to the iuaaiana, tor they are ollly schiematics. whilst the Japanese are ter-
?:&. J. Dillon, !h! ~lipae 2.t iuasia, (New York, 1918), .283-.284. 
10 
rible pagans. ,,8 Fears of the "Yellow Peril" trom Japan and the superiori tl 
udar God of the white race made the war aee. like a crusade t and this ia 
jut what the Czar tried to make out of this usele .. bloodshed. One biosra-
pher of Nicholu 88.1a that Witte's sucoe.or, aehve, had been workiag to get 
this foreign war started 80 that public attentioa would be taken aftJ from 
the di.turbed situation at home. fhe war also played up to the Czar's .ystie 
COReeption of hiuelf u the aanov of the lut an4 the challpion of the white 
race, the onl7 diffiCNlt, being that, though Nicholas JIlight be able to start 
a war quite easily t he oould not end eme as eaa11y.9 
Just u all the We.tern Datio.. considered Russia as the righteous 4e-
fender of We.tern oulture agailUlt the barbariaas of Japan, so thel alao felt 
that Ruuia would uke quiok work of this upstart little toe. Nobod7 had 
beat .. Russia for oenturies; she waa suppose to be eteru.lll ubeatable. But 
Japan waa quite sure ot herself and of Russia'. real statue; .he did not jump 
iato a fiCht with the huge _pire without a good hope of succe.a. Actually, 
as later investigation has borne out, not O8.ly was Ruaaia unprepared but ahe 
had not the alightest idea of a plan to follow or even to adopt. Japan soon 
showed that she hael been preparing for years and that the whole ... tion was be-
hiad the war effort. She knew what ahe wanteel, and. as ahe had not been able 
to get that through peaoeful .eana, ahe fiaall1 reaorted to war. The.aiD. 
endence of her preparedne.. and long-tel'll plaDning was her succes.ion of 
rlctorie. OIl lanel and, more particularly. OIl the .ea. !'rOIl the attack on 
Snennett, Roeevelt, 61. 
9Moh •• ed, Eaaad-h" !1oholy !!. Priaon!£ 2! ~ Purple. (New York, 
1937), 126. 
11 
Port Arthur on 'ebru8l'7 8, 1904 Wltil the final crullhinl de teat ud annihila-
tion ot the remainder ot the .aunian fieet at the .ttle ot 'tauahiu Strai tit 
011 May 27-28, 1905 Japan. wore doVll Rue.ian resistance and re.olution. The 
sudde. and decisive reversal of lussian aupraa01 ohanged the op1Dion ot the 
entire world. It will be noted later wbat a protound etfect this wave ot Jap-
an .. e viotories had OIl President Boo.evelt. 
But neither was the war wholl, to Japant. advantaae. Though it WIUI not 
real1zed at the t1lle nor tor SOIle t1lla after, Japan WIUI OIl the verge ot 001-
lapse b1 the aprilll ot 1905. Her _power -PPl1 WIUI being .e1":l.0ual1 and 
qu1ckl1 deplet.d. Earl11n 1905 Japane.e agricultural interest. oomplained 
tbat U1 further 10 •••• of tarmer. to the militaJ'1 ettort would gravel1 en-
clu&er tood production. Also. Japan was gettinc tarth.r and farther aW87 trOll 
her source ot aupplie. and her aupplJ line. were becoming extended and much 
harder to aaiatain. Japan'. world credit was .earing exhau.tio. and the war 
WIUI co.t1ag her one million dollars a '-1 toward the end. Foreiga banker. 
were refusing to make an7 more loans and ninety percent ot the war was ti~ 
nance' with toretlll oapital.10 In the spring the Japane.e a:rtq and Jl&Y1 COlI-
maaders returned tro. the tront 8A4 pleaded with the hoaae cover.a.ent to make 
peace. But, on the positive aide, Japan still bad her people, as a whole, 
behind her. And she leaned on her alliance with li'Ggland, tor IIlOre than IDOral 
strength. 
Rwulia'. situation WIUI juat as precarious tor other reasons and it cer-
tainl1 was no better than Japan'.. Though Ruaaian JIaIl-power was unlimi ted 
lOAltred L. P. Dennis. Advtntures !:!t 1!plOlUlCl, 1896-1906, (New York, 
1928). lt02. 
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a4 her .PPll Une. were beocaiag ehorter, the aegati ye factors were jWlt aa 
a.larad..ng,. Her auppllUne was • one-track railroad, 4:1.tticult to use" to re-
pair, an4 to pard. Rus.ia had llOD.et&r1 troublea ai.II1lar to those ot Japan" 
baaause foreip iateresta who were larPll rellpOUible for t1aanc1ng the Rua-
man &14e of the war, were retuillg to lea4 the Czar U7 IIOre aone1. More 
oruo1al11, the war had not 4:1.verted the people's attentioa from the internal 
uarest, u wu clearlT eY:1.denced oa Janual7 22. 1905. whea the Czar's sol-
diera tired on a IIOb and ld.lled 500 persona. !hat "Blood1 8undqtr waa 0Dl7 
the be&1nn1.Da ad it allowed tbat the people were discouraged nth the hOlH 
conditione while the1 telt tbat the war ad the scenes ot battle were remote 
ad almost foreip. Dur1Dg the war France, Ruaa1a 'a _jor IIOra! and 1l0net&r7 
.pport, bad becOIle _broiled 1n Morocco. thanka to the Kaiser, and waa unable 
to &1 ve Ruaa1a auch aid of all'1 kind. 
But, while the Japaneae lII111t&1"1 command demanded peace, the Russian hip 
commaad uader Geaeral Alekaei Xuropatk:1.n wanted to keep up the !aposa1ble 
tight. 
Kuropatk1n, who, after the death of>1:he Foreign Minister, Maraviett, 
de11berate17 1nc11aed to a cOIlci11atol'1 poli01 1.a the Far East, and 
who poaa ••• ed the W&1's and aeana of Dowing the true state of thinge 
there, wu eathu1ut1c ill his plea for contiauinc the var ill Man-
churia and for patience in iusia, while his premiaes of decia1Ye 
YictOl"1 were ao confident, 80 emphatic, ao :CI"equent and circwutan-
tial that it would haYe be.n rash vere the crown to treat th4tfl s11ght-
i.D.glJ 80 long aa it uintained his at the head of the forces. 
Aad the Czar seoret17, at least, wu ia :fayor of the war. He would prefer a 
aUit&J'1 defe.t rather tban • disgraceful peace, which he was aure would be 
the result ot a peace coaterence, and, his II1Di.tera supported hill. Dillon 
UDiUon, f&l1p!e, 299. 
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say. that "Nicholu II coaaunicated through hi. lIin1aters with the principal 
notabilities, Ililit&r7, naval, and civil, ad asked them to giye their opinicm 
011 the advisability of, endiq the war. And the yot majority 01 the answer. 
were diatinctl1 unfayorable. ,,12 fhe reyolutioaariea vi thin Russia conaidered 
that the war, ad thu ita cCintia1lU.Ce ... their opportun.i.ty for aroua1ng 
the mae... ..aiaat the Czar. 
fhi ... how thinca stood when theodore Roo.eYelt made hi. appearance on 
the acene and offered hi. service. u peaceaaker. Japan. on the point 01 ex-
hau8tion, waDte" peace on her own terma, Russia did not want peace, but could 
not long continue the war. iooseYelt was supposed to please both parties. 
CHAPTER II 
PEACE OVERTURES FROM JAPAN AND THE FIRST 
STEPS OF ROOSEVELT TOWARD A CONFZRENCE 
As the war continued the need for peace on the part ot both belligerents, 
as already discussed, became evident. The next need vas tor a mediator; and, 
Theodore Roosevelt was to emerge as the mediator, the antagonistic peacemaker. 
A look at Roosevelt's general toreign policy is essential for an under-
standing of his mediation at Portsmouth and the reasons behind it. In the 
last decade ot the nineteenth century Roosevelt, Altred Mahan, and Henry 
Cabot Lodge, with other progressive thinkers in government service, were be-
sinning to occupy positions of authority trom which they could direct American 
toreign policy. '.theirs was a policy of imperiali_, they saw the growing na-
tion lUI one destined to become a partner with the other great nations of the 
world. A number of elements went into the formation of this new group. They 
were intensely proud of their country, so proud of it that they were sure that 
whatever it did in any way, particularly in an imperial wal, must be right. 
Their righteous, ethical spirit was a reflection of the crusading missionary 
spirit ot the times. They were proud of their Anglo-Saxon blood and heritage, 
and they felt that many areas of the world would be so much better otf it 
their great heritage could be imposed 011 them. this imposition could be 
through peaceful or warlike means, and the latter was considered as good as 
14 
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the former when necessary. 
All these ideas and more were food for Roosevelt's thought and he pounced 
on occasions for putting them into effect. In the early days he was for Amer-
ica first, last, and always. As he~ew into the toreign policy atmosphere he 
realized that lite was not quite so simple as he had originally thought, that 
there would have to be some sort of peacetul co-existence among nations--even 
if this had to be bought at the price of war. Roosevelt gradually gained a 
world view of politiCS; he began to see that European affairs were often close-
ly and mysteriously related to Far Eastern affairs. He came to see that Amer-
ica's relations with other nations. friendly and hostile. were extremely 1m-
portot. He saw that the United States must enter into international politics 
and rivalry it she was to take her place among the world powers. It would be 
a self-centered game but America must play it as well as the other empire 
builders. 
So America .. t take her part and Roosevelt started his career of direct-
ing imperial Amerioa during his term as Assistant Secretary of the NaV1 in 
1897 and 1898. He oontinued his imperialistic urgings during hi. tenure of 
office as governor of New York, and, when he was shelved into the Vice Presi-
dency, he campaigned for imperialism. but .tyled it by the safer name of ex-
pansion. '!hus he advocated the "manifest de.tiny" of the United States in 
the Blodem world. In all this he knew that he had to educate the publio to 
this new ooncept of American partioipation in a new world order. Roosevelt 
spoke glowingly on this subjeot as early as November 1897 when he said: 
As our modern life goes on. ever accelerating in rapidity, and 
the nations are drawn closer together for good and for evil and 
the natio~ grows in comparision with friends and rivals, it is 
impossible to adhere to the policy of isolation. We cannot a-
void responsibilities, and we must meet them in a noble or ig-
noble manner, by hiding our heads, hoping to escape them or 
shirk them, or by meeting them manfully, as our fathers did. 
We cannot avoid, as a nation, the fact that on the east and 
west we look across the waters at Europe and Asia. l 
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Thus Roosevelt expressed his ideas on the subject of the maintenance of 
the balance of power with the United States taking her proper part and place 
among the nations. Whether Roosevelt created much new policy is not, at this 
point, a question of extreme importance. Perhaps he did not, as Philip Jessup 
suggests: "Probably Roosevelt would have been shocked to discover how little 
foreign policy he himself created. There was left to him little but to follow 
the paths which McKinley, Root, and chiefly Hay, had thought out and project-
ed.,t2 Later some of Roosevelt's more original contributions will be dis-
cusaedJ ot course, he did not start by throwing away past achievements and 
strategy~ 
In brief. Roosevelt wanted the United States to be "strong enough to saf 
guard its legitimate interests in any part of the world, and able to play its 
part in maintaining a balance of global power that would assure continued 
peace for all nations.'" He advocated armed force, if necessary, particularly 
it it was necessary to maintain the United States' position as a world power. 
lHoward K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt !!l2. lh! ~ 2! America !2. World 
Power, (Baltimore, 1956'. 253, "Address before the Society of Naval Architects 
and Marine Engineers t" from !!!J! !2.!:5 2!m, Nov. 13 t 1897. 
2Philip c. Jessup, ~!22!, 2 volse, (New York, 1938), II, 3. 
3Foster Rhea Dulles, lb!. Imperial Years, (New York, 1956), 228. 
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All Rooae.,.elt billSelf put it. "Only the warlike power of a civilized peo-
ple ••• can giye peace to the world • ..4 
Ia appl.y1nc thi. poliCl to the Far Eastern situation Roo • ..,.e.!t was at 
leut consi.tent if not e.peciallJ succes.ful. When he finall.J begu to p&1 
athatioa to Far Eaatem affaire it was wi thin this fruework that he thoucht 
eel pl..amled. He paiel little attentiOJl to the J'ar .. t uatil 1904 when the 
haao-Japaae.e War turneel hi. thought. &Del attention to the area. Bt.tt vb_ 
he did INnel the situatiOJl. he u.ecliatel1 realized that the United State. 
ad a buddiq _pire to cletend in the PaCitich After all, the Ua1ted State. 
held the Philippine and HawaUaa Ial.anda. and her pl.au tor a oanal aorOH the 
Iathmua ot Pa.Jwaa were another part ot Alaerioaa Pacific poliCl. 
~e k.,..toae ot '.theodore Ro08..,.elt'. Far .. tera toreilll poli01. aa ot 
hi ... ner&1 fOftiga poliC1. waa the maintenance of the balance of power. In 
the Far East the United Statee was ueiag the Open Door poliCl to defend her 
interest. ad to maintain the balance ot power. Secretar1 ot State John Ba.1 
had initiated. the Open Door poliC1. as tar .. the United atate. wae coacerned. 
with hi. Dot •• to the powers cODcerniDg the territorial iatearit1 ot China 
and. with China, that ot Manchuria. Bq hacl iae"ed ncb Dote. in 1899 and 
1900 ... well .. in 1902. fhe.e Dote. were rather ideali.tic yenture. aince 
thel had no C08rciYe torce Dor sanction beh1ad th_. As was pointed out 
abOTe' • ., realized thi., he kaew that the United State. could not enforce 
the.e BOte.. but, at 1 ... t, th ••• not •• were about the .tron, •• t poaaible 
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.. asure which the United States could take 1D defense of Chine.e integrity and 
American interests in China. Sooner than Roose.,elt. B'a1 realised the groaa 
inadequacy ot the.e notes, while the former charsed into the Far East as the 
detender ot the Open Door, thinking that he could make such a policy ettective. 
But he BOOB aaw t as Hq bad, that the United States just could not take &n7 
aggressive measure. to back up her notes tor the public would not aupport such 
mo.,ea and the situation was not ot such vital interest or importance. Roose-
.,elt did as much as he could by declaring American neutrality at the outbreak 
of the Ruaso-Japaneae War, and he requested and received meaningless declara-
tions trom the belligerenta to the ettect that they would respect the integri-
ty ot China. Each ot the belligerents interpreted China in w878 that aerved 
their own respective interests to the best ad.,antage--which meant that Russia 
det1nitely considered Manchuria as being outside ot the territorial dominion 
ot China. 
While Russia's stand on Manchuria had not changed, and e.,erlone knew it, 
&!gland'. 1ar Eastern polic," was identical; but, most surprisingly, Roosevelt 
did not realize this. Somehow or other Roosevelt was abaolute17 certain that 
British and American interests in the Far East were identical, and he made 
this a fuadamental principle ot his toreign poli01. His aaaumption vas not 
only talse but coatl1. While the United Stat •• could put down as her chiet 
objectives 1D the Far East the detense of American possessions and the main-
tenance ot the Open Door tor her commercial interests, Britain vas more aggres-
si.,e and forward. She wanted to insure her.elf asainst &n7 coalition of the 
EUropean powers which would isolate her in the East. Britain was using her 
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dOlri nant poei tion in certain parts of China chietly as a defense of her colo-
nial empire in India. Br1 tain held Chinese land I the United States did not 
and Deyer vanted to. 
It the aboye remarks on BooseYelt's foreign poliC1 in the Far laat .e .. 
rather sketchy, Roosnelt's thought was no less .etohy. at least in the be-
ginning, and unrealisticall1 idealistic. It took a situation, like the Russo-
Japan .. e War, to bring his ide ... doVll to earth; but, eYen then, .. will be 
seen, Booseyelt had a lot to learn. But when the war did come, Roosevelt's 
attitude toward the participants was quite realistic. In discussing this tac-
et ot RooseYel t t S poliq the core of this th~s1s will be approaohed. 
1'-e 'best w&7 to see ad to arriye at an UDderstanding ot 'fheodore Roose-
yel t' s Iliad wi th reprd to Russia and Japan is to atudJ his remarks and judg-
.eDt. which he eXpressed concel'lling the.e two nations. r.ro. this perusal we 
will be able to understand his reaction at hsaia and Japan's aggressive ac-
tivit, oyer their IlUtual spheres ot innuence, Manchuria and Korea. First let 
us stud1 Booseyelt'. view ot Rwuda, and then ot Japan. 
ReoHYel t llirrored current American distaste tor au_ian Czarism and des-
poti. as well as a distrust ot .88ia· s chronic disllol1est ad shitt, diplo-
.. tic .ethods. Men .entioned Ruasia's double-dealing in inviting American 
commercial interest. into Manchuria and then almost taxing the. out ot exist-
ence. What angered eYe1"1one was Ru.ssia's roughshod occupation of Manchuria 
and her elisregard. of all foreign interests in that region. 
Japan, in Ieosevelt's .,88, was an ... ainl and great little nation. He 
thought bighlJ ot the Japanese people and of the Japanese Goyernment and 
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shared in the American faTortism of the underdog in the war. Japan amazed 
Roo.evelt by her sudden and uninterrupted Tietories, and only later did her 
record t.r1ghten him into the realization that Japan might become a real enemy 
of American interests in the Pacific and the far East. His attitude toward 
Japan, u that of the country in general, we baaed more on sentiment than on 
facts I but, he realized that Japan was a potential threat to American holdinp 
and intere.ts. He saw that Japan, if left alone, was going to destroy ally sem 
blance of a Far Eastern balance of power. Gradual.l1 he cue around to the p0-
sition that it would be best for the interests of all concerned if, atter the 
war, Russia and Japan faced each other in a fair17 balanced position. Von 
Sternberg, the German ambassador to the United States, quotes RooseTelt to 
this effect I 
It is to our intere.t that the war between Russia and Japan 
lIhould drag on, so that both powers .y exhauat themselves as 
much as possible and that their geographical aresa of friction 
should not be elimiDated after the conclusion of the peace. and 
that, as regards the limits of their spheres of infiuence, they 
should remain opposed to each other in the same ~ as they were 
before the war. Thi. will keep them gn a war footing and reduce 
their appetite for other territories. 
In the beginning of the war Roo.evel t .. especially benevolent toward Japan 
since he considered that she wae "p!a1ing our game. tt7 In Roosevelt' s ow 
words we can find a nice presentatioll of just what he thought of Russia and 
Japan, and how he introduced his dual policy of treading lightly with a bil 
6DeDZlis, Adventure., 364; Denni. quotes from G.P. XIX, part 1, No. '992, 
pp. 112-ll}, i.e. aR!!, ms.e Pftlitik del' !\WOW.chen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 
Berlin, 1927, eeli ted by Erste Hilfte. 
7Eclward H. Zabrialde. seric!B-!ussian Rivalry !a !h!. !!!: f.aat, (Phila-
delphia, 1946), 104. 
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stick or his policy of nice words b4cked up with arms. He wrote to George 
Meyer. his ambassador at St. Petersburg, along these lines. 
Personally. I admire the Russian people; but I think the Russian 
government represents all that is worst, most insincere and un-
scrupulous, and most reactionary; and undoubtedly our people who 
live in Japan are better treated by the Japanese and have more 
81IIpathy with them than is the cue with those who live 1A Rue-
aia. I like the Japanese; but of course I hold myself in readi-
neas to see them get puffed up with pride if they are viotorious 
• • • We must rely upon our fighting power, in the first plaoe, 
and upon being just and fair in our dealings with other nations, 
in the seoond place. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
He (ipring Rice, friend of Roo.evelt and in British embaasy at 
St. Peteraburj) knowa just how I feel on all theae _tters, and 
you can talk with him without any reserYe. England's interest 
is exactly oura as regards this Oriental oomplioation, and is 
11kely to remain so. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
if peaoe should come now, Japan ought to have a protectorate over 
Korea (which has shown ita utter inabi11t1 to stand by it.elf) 
and ought to succeed to Russia's rights in and -sound Port Arthur, 
while I hope to aee Manchuria re.tored to China. 
In this frame of mind Roosevelt was working his wrq toward becoming me-
diator. Aa will be seen when we come to evaluate Roosevelt's Portsmouth work 
and ita aign.ificance. he did not campaign for the job of peaoemaker; but, he 
was available and relatively acceptable to the parties concerned. When the 
time did come Roosevelt did not charge in as the saviour of Russia and Japan, 
even though he was eager to work for peace. ~ough he did want peace, still 
he did not come onto the Rus.o-Japane.e acene with purely altruistic motives. 
Among the many reasons which could be presented there are a few which stand 
out as the more important motives which moved Roosevelt into the position of 
a,.".eodore Roo.evelt, ll1! Letters .2! Theo40re Roo!evelt, 8 vola., edited 
by Elting E. Morison, (Cambriclce, Mass., 1951-19$4>, IV, 1115-1ll6, "Roose. 
velt to Meyer," reb. 6, 1905. 
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arbitrator. Roosevelt was crusading tor the maintenance ot the Open Door and 
the territorial integrity ot China. :tVen here he was not particularly id.al .... 
istic, but rather he was actually looking out tor American economic and ca.-
mercial interests in and with China. Another obj.ctive ot his was to make 
sure that n.ither Russia nor Japan would elierS' from the war as suprem. victor, 
as he hoped that .ach nation would tace the other, atter the war, on a some-
what equal tooting. Another strong motive was Roosevelt's desire to make the 
Unit.d States a prominent world power, and the glory resulting trom his .edia-
tion would be on. way ot getting praise tor the UBi ted Statee and putting her 
on the top ot the diplou.t1c ladder. Two other reasons can eae1ly be dis-
c.rned in Roosevelt's motivation tor becoming peacemaker: his own egoti .. and 
his ticht to maintain the balance ot power in the Far East. Perhapa above all 
other reasons Roosevelt was struggling to pres.rve that tenuous aftair called 
the balance ot pow.r. Be wanted neither Russia nor Japan to be supreme in the 
Far East, and h. did not want an:r other country to com. out on top in the 
oheckboard that was China. Bow practical and how realistic h. was in thi. 
deeire to keep the balanc. ot pow.r will be discussed later. The tinal reason 
or motive, which will b. discussed here, and on. which, by no means, pla:r.d a 
small part in Roos.velt's b.coming mediator was his personal pride in tackling 
such a job. Add to this desire, an aspiration cOBlon to many men, the tact 
that Roosevelt was the sort ot man he was and one can suppose that the person-
al .lement, Roosevelt'. egotism, played a more than noticeable part in his 
Portsmouth work. And so Roosevelt was soon to come into contact with the b.l-
ligerents who wanted and need.d peace. Nobody realized the dire situations ot 
Ru.sia and Japan; and, particularly, neither belligerent realized how badly 
ott the other was. France wanted peace for at least two reasons: she was be-
coming embroiled in Morocco and she wanted Russia to stand by her und.r th.ir 
Dual Alliance. French bankers were unwilling to loan RuHia any IROre IROn.,., 
sinc. Bussia was too great a tinancial risk particularly after the det.at in 
the Battle of Taushima. Whereas a ,.ear and a half before she had work.d tor 
war, Ge~ was working for peace now for the Kaiser saw Russia sufficiently 
weakened and boged down in the Far East and h. was beginning to f.ar that the 
revolutionary movement and spirit rampant in Rusaia would spread we.tward. to 
GermaQ1. ~land less urgently wanted peace since she had. no special advan-
tage to gain either ~--particularly since she was sure that diplomatic sup-
port would be the maximum contribution to JaPan which sh. would giv. under the 
Aaglo-Japane.e Alliance of 1902. ADd the United Stat.s som.what nobly wanted 
peac., not so much b.cause of any vital interest. but rather because war was 
not a nice thing. 
But it was one thing to want peace and quite anoth.r to go about obtain-
ing it. "Four diff.rent methods of peacemaking were advocated, an interna-
tional conference, mediation through England and France, the allie., respec-
tive1,., of the belligerents; m.diation b,. the United States; and direct neso-
tiation between Rus8ia and Japan. .fOyer all hung the shadow ot intervention 
b,. a conc.rt of Powers."9 An international conterenc. was teared b,. Russia 
and Japan as the,. both had lost at such me.tings; Japan most recently atter 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The other pos8ible ways were speculated on 
and urged by the interested parties. From the start direct negotiation ap-
9Denn.tt, BoOf.v.lt, 170. 
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peered to be the best way, at least to both belligerents. 
aussia aotually made the first, though very unofficial, move through the 
former Minister, Witte. In the early days of the war in 1904 and qain ill 
1905 Witte approached Count~uhi, Japanese llliniater at Paris, but his final 
attempt as his first .et with failure. Be was told that as he had abaolutel1 
110 infiuence in the pr.sent Russian government it would be usele .. to deal 
with or through h1m.10 The oounsels of Japan were, at firat, as divided .. 
Russia's but gradually Japan's leader. consolidated to urge peaoe. In the 
.pring of 1905 Japan approached Roosevelt through Kogoro Takahira, Japanese 
Mbassador to Washington, but when the forater suggested that Japan openly and 
direotly ask for peace hi. sugge.tion vas rejected.ll !be lrenoh Premier Del-
o ... e augge.ted to Motono, a Japane.e offioial in Pari., that Ruaaia might be 
ready to talk peaoe and Delc ... ' offered hi •• ervioes as intermediary.12 Bu.t 
Japan hesitated to uae the .ervioe. of Nussta'. ally. At the same time Taka-
hira kept Roosevelt informed of all the.e happenings, and revealect Japan's 
leaning toward Roosevelt as mediator. 
Meanwhile Roosevelt had not been exaotly silent oonoerning hie availa-
bility for the role of mediator. As earl1 as Deoember 1904 he had .hown hi .... 
• elf quite willing. although he never really rushed into the position as might 
have been expeoted of a man of his temperament and ideas. In late Deoe.ber 
1904 he wrote to Spring Rioe I nas a matter of faot I have very def1n1 tel1 
lOoennett, Roosevelt, 43-44. 
llZabrisJd.e t Amerioan-Russian R1vala, 113 note. 
12Dennett, Roosevel,. 174-175. 
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concluded what I intend to do if circumstances permit, so far as this far 
eastern question is concerned."l' What wae in his mind is anyone's guesa. 
Be would still have to wait tor the right opportunity. 
In the meantime he did not sit idly but he instructed Secretary Ba1 to 
send out the open door circulars, which the latter dispatched in January 1904, 
and again in the spring of 1905. Perhaps his most celebrated move was his 
warning given earl1 in the war to France and Germany. Dennett lauds this warn 
ing in the following words: "We do not see how President Roosevelt could have 
won hie victory tor the preser.ation ot the integrity ot China in 1905 if he 
had no! tirst eer.ed notice on France and Germany that he was prepared to take 
the side ot Japan it either Power came torward to assist Russia in the parti-
tion ot the Empire."l~ Roosevelt mentioned this notice in writing to Spring 
Rice in July 1905' 
Aa soon as the war broke out I notified Gel'Blall1 and France in 
IIOst polite and discreet taahion that in the event ot a combi-
nation against JaJWl to try to do what Russia, Gerr&lall1 and France 
did to her in 1894, I ahould promptl1 side with Japan and prooeed 
to whatever length was necessary on her behalt. I ot course knew 
that your government would act in the same way. and thought it 
best that I should have nOl~onaultation with your people before 
announCing ~ own purpose. 
What is very noteworthy about thi. note which Dennett praise. so highly is 
that no record ot it bas ever been found. No collection of Roosevelt manu-
scripta, no foreign office, or State Department archive has brought this mon-
13ttooeevelt, Letters, IV. l08~. "Roosevelt to Spring Rice." Dec. 27. 
1904. 
l~Dennett, !go.evelt, 336. 
l~seveltt kttm, IV, 128~. "Roosevelt to Spring Rice, tt Jul1 24, 
1905. 
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WHntal l.tt.r to light. h March 1905 Roa.y.lt wrote Sir Georg. Otto 'fre-
•• 110 that h. had approached the Ru •• iaB co •• rmaent, both directl,. and iJl-
d1rectlJ. on the subj.ct of peace.16 
It vaa in thi •• am. month that Roo •• velt and the Kai.er .tart.d their 
somewhat rautual 110 ••• for peace. On the initiative of the Kai.er, Roo ...... lt 
had •• nt out the open door circulars of 1904 anel 1905. Th. Presid.nt did not 
.e. that the Kais.r was trying to get England and hanc. out of China 80 that 
the Kai.er and hi. cousin, the Czar, could have China ed Manohuria to them-
.el ••• , !he Kaiser'a moti.e. weI'. different but about as altrui.tio as Rooae-
v.lt'a, while Roo.ev.lt never r.alized that:the Kai •• r was Pla1ing him tor the 
fool. It would b. an inyolved .tud,. in ita.lt to go into the German-American 
r.lat1ana as th.,. cam. to bear on each other during the Ru.so-Japane.e War aBel 
the Portsaouth Coaference. 'l'he Kaiaer alwqa i_gined that France and England 
were readJ to take the l ... t occasion to .tart a world oongre.. to .ettle the 
war, and he WarDed Roo.e.elt of this again ad again. 1'hough Roo.evelt was .. 
Roh aga.iJlet noh a ooagr... lUI the Kaiaer t h. thought the Kaiser vaa oy.rex-
aggeratiDe the lAll •• l? Ia all taime_ 1t IlU8t 'be admitted tbat duriac the 
Conferenc. the Kai.er did put pressure on the Cur to make peaoe, but b,. then 
the Kaiser vaa willing to acc.pt peaoe at almo.t 8D1 pric. because he teared 
that the "'ian re"folut10na1'1 ap1r1 t II1ght apr.ad into Ge~. 
While th •• e uchiJaatioaa were going OIl behind the soen.. Japan repeat 
16!l!i!.. IV, 1134. "Roo ••• elt to Tr.yelyan." March 9, 1905. 
l?IbiS\ •• IV, 1150. nico .... 1t to lIq," March 30. 1905. alao 1288. "Roo. 
Yelt to !ov.r," July 2? 1905. 
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trounoed Russia. Immediate17 after the orushing victor,y at the Battle of 
'tlJushi~. Mar 27-28, 190.5. Takab1ra ended the rOUDd-about lIethod of suggest. 
1Bg peace aegotiatioJl8 and seoret17 asked Rooseyelt to start to prepare the 
wrq lor actual ooalerenoes. (')nl.y five days before the Battle of !sushi_ . 
Rooseyelt had writtea to Me,erl "As for peaoe, I also oOJl8ider that out of 
the qUHtion for the ti.. MillS. The parties are yer,y far apart 'both in their 
esU ... te. of the chaaoes of war od as to what should be dOlle at the ead of 
the war.ttl.8 !Yo daJs later he ap.iJl wrote Me,er& "Thel (the JapaD.se) are, 
howeYer, perfect17 ooafideat •••• 'Dle RuaaiaJl8 on the other hand are YU7 
auch elated ed will adyanoe Ilothillg ia the W&'J' of terma whioh the Japee.e 
VOllld eyea oouider. 80 I gil ... that there is nothiq to clo but watoh th .. 
tight it out. ,,19 But 1>1 MaJ ,1. the 4aJ 'l'akahira approached Roo.eyelt, the 
situaUoa was such partioular17 ill '1'olqo, that Japan va_ quite wil.l.iJlg to lq 
the fOlUlclatioJl8 tor aegotiaUou. '!'he Japan •• e note to Roosevelt was a yer,y 
ol .. er and rather amusia, dooumeatt 
1be Japan .. e GoYel'J1llleat still adhere to the oonvictio. that the 
peace .egotiatiOJl8, whe. th.,- 0011., should be oonducted direot17 
and ncluaive17 betweea the Mlllgereat., but eyen in 8Uoh cas. 
triend17 ... i.tooe of a neutral will be essential in order to 
brillS th .. tocether ••• ad the Japanese (Joyernment would pre-
fer to haYe that office undertakea b1 a neutral in 'Who.e good 
judpeat ael ·wi.e direction the, haYe enUre oonfideaoe. You 
will express to the Presideat that ••• he will .ee his w81 41-
ren11 ad eatire17 ot his own aotion ed iJd.tiati ... e to invite 
the two bellisereat_ to cOIle topther for the purpo.e ot direct 
.egoU.tioD ••• ad ,OU will MIte it _tire17 olear to the 
Pre.ideat that the Japanese (Joy.rnaeat haYe ao iat.ation 1>1 the 
pres.t comnnmicatioa to approach Russia either direct17 or in-
18~. IV, 1189, "Roo.eyelt to Meyer, ft MaJ 22, 190.5. 
19D.i,d..t IV, 1191. "Roosevelt to Meyer," Ma7 24, 1905. 
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directl1 on the subject of peace.20 
In this letter Tolqo reaffirmed its purpose in fightingl "'l'he war, from Ja-
pants point of n.ew, is essential.l.y and exclusivel, one of self-defense. It 
has never. so tar as she is concerned, possessed ~ element of self-aggran-
41zement. Accordingly, the demands to be formulated b1 Japan will only be 
cOllllensurable with the original objects to be attained. tt21 
Roosevelt was amused at Japan's suggestion that he use his own "initia-
tive" but he vas above taking of tease at Japaa's suggestion. Roosevelt imme-
41ate17 proceeded to approach SUesta. It was oBly ,.ears later that the vorld 
learned tbat Japaa had actuall,. initiated the peace moves. In any event, 
vh11e Ioosevelt sounded out Rusaia through 1ts Wuhtngton aabaa.ador, Count 
eae.ia". the ltaiAer bepa to put pre88U1"8 on the Ozar. Cass1n1. at firet 
bruah.ed otf Roosevelt'. suggestion as 'being out ot question but he promised 
to cOllYe1 the President's meesace to 8t. Petersburg. Aa Roosevelt did not 
trust Cusiai he ordered Meyer. who had recent17 been appointed to St. Peters-
ArS, to approach the Cur directl,.. On JUD.e 6 Caasin1 suppoaedl;y brought the 
otficial repl1 ot hie govel'DlDen't--a retuealJ but on the next day Me,.er cabled 
that the Czar had somewhat coo11 accepted Roosevelt's otter. Caas1n1 practi-
call,. accused the President ot l11aI. and Roosevelt tinallf had to get .,er'. 
cable confirmed b1 the Russian foreign minister, Count Lamadortf. 
On June 8 Roosevelt took the first otficial step when he pubUcly cabled 
2°Deuett, Roosevelt, 21,. 
21Ib1d •• 216· 
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to both belU,erente an identioal note, inY1tins them to OOIIe topther.2Z Ja-
pan and Ituaaia replied in the attirutiYe, the tOJ'ller 011 JUT' ' 10, and the lat-
ter two days later.23 In this wq Roots"elt began his peacemak1ng work, vbich 
appeared toredoomed. The Pruident bad the barclut time tJo:y1ng to convince 
Ruesia that he waa 1ateneniAg, iD part, in order to preyent Rueaia troll be1n& 
driven compl.etel1 out ot the Far East. l'he.Ruaaiana could not ••• how an1 con-
tereno. could poae1bly turn a milit&r7 4.t_t into a diplomatic triumph. 1'h.,. 
.t111 tboupt that the next battle might Dri.ng them glor1oua victorJ. All tor 
the poaaibil1t1 ot Yicto17 at the conference table the), ven .oon to .. e tbat 
it was poae1ble. and the,. later Jllf1Jl8p4 th .... lv ••• 0 well that the public, 
tor awhil., thousht that Ruaeia waa the victor in the Portaouth Cont.rence 
and the 'rreat,--and not the victia. Actually,.. will be •• en, Rusa1& wu 
mether Yictar nor not1ll. 
a.at troaa the 'ftr1 tirat, chance. tor an amicabl.e .ettleraent looked bleak 
and troublu arose loD.s betore the tlltO belli,erents vera alQ'Where near cOllinc 
together. The tlltO 'b1a quutiou were the choice of a ."tine place and the 
power. which tbe 4elept1ou would haye. In solring the .. two probl_ to the 
_ti·sfactioa ot both bel.i.igerent. BooMv.lt di8plqe4 extreme tact and tiplo-
_tic abilitr, althouP both countri .. , in ditterent WfA'18. bad coaplete17 ex-
up.rated him. After lINCh exchange ot correspoadence Waabjngton, D.C •• was 
ftaall1 and mutuall1 agree4 on. when Ru.u1a auddenl.1 changed. her mind. The 
Prea1dent had. alread)' armotmced that Waab:i.ngton wu to be the raeeting plac. 
2ZBooaeYelt, k'ttra. IV, V..24, :in "Roosevelt to Lodge,lf Jwe 16, 1905. 
2~., 122'+-1225, in "Booaeve1t to Lodge, ft J\IIle 16, 190'. 
and he refused to go back on the previous agreement. (PortBJIouth eventually' 
was the meeting place because the summer heat of Washington was too oppresive 
tor such work.) He wrote to Meyer: ''Explain to Count Lamsdorff and if 1'1eces-
&ar1 to the Tear that I am convinced that on conaideration they will of their 
own acco~d perceive that it is entirely out of the question for me now to re-
verse the action I took in accordance with the request ot the Russian Goyern-
ment. which action has been communicated to and acquiesced in by Japan, and 
has been published to the entire vorld • ..a4 
!he Japanese also caused a delay because they teared that the Russians 
would send delegates with lesser powers than ,their own would have. Japan 
wanted to be sure that the Russian officials would have full powers to nego-
tiate and conclude peace. otherwise she hinted that she would be unwilling 
even to meet.25 The President tried to call a halt to Japan's tactics when 
he sent !akahira a message the latter was to relay to his home government: 
'*Moreover, the President teels most strongly' that the question of the powers 
ot the plenipotentiaries is not in the least .. 'l'i tal question, whereas it is 
vital. that the meeting should take place it there is any purpose to get peace. 
If there was no sincere desire to get peace, tilltll the iact of the plenipoten-
tiaries having full powers would not ill B11T way avail to secure i t..',26 In Ja-
puts letter ot acknowledgment and acceptance, as in Rusaia·s, she had agreed 
24lbid •• IV. 1228. in "Rooseyelt to Lodge," June 16. 1905. 
2'Xbid., IV, 1228, in "RooseYelt to Lodge,'· June 16, 1905. 
26~, in "Roos",el t to Lodge," J\U1e 16, 1905. 
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to send delegates who would have full powers.2? Her action may have caused 
Russia to de1a7 longer than usual, for had Japan b •• n more explicit about her 
d.l.gat.. and their powers Russia might hay. shown heraelf more willing to 
.. et. M it finally turned out, Russia point.dl.J said that from the first 
she had had every intention of sending d.legat .. with full powers--after all, 
that was what the word pl.nipot.ntiary meant. In the .nd Japan actually sent 
emiasaries with l .... r pow.rs than those of the Russian representati.es. since 
the decisions of the Japanese representativ.s .till required the approval of 
the Japan •• e Imperial Di.t. while the Russian delegates had power to discus. 
and conclude peace in the name ot the Czar. 
fbrough all these prelimiDarJ difficulties Roosevelt strove to straighten 
out the way for eventual negotiations. No other power or person was in such a 
favorable position as far as the b.llig.rents w.re concerned. Roosevelt some-
how calmly waited for the golden opportunity. though he was not •• p.ciall7 
anxious that it cOIle his way- AIl.rice int.reats w.re not extrem.l,. vital in 
Manchuria and much len so in Kor.a, but e1nce AIIerica was going to hay. to 
take its place among the imperial powers ot the world Boosevelt was determined 
that she ahould do so in grand atyl.. FUrthermore, Roo •• velt, as mediator, 
could implement his poliC7 b,. stopping a war that had ceas.d to be "righteous" 
and he could maintain that utopian balance of power in the Far East, and thus 
peace in the world. 
~ds this all his .ttorts had been directed, especially since Japan's 
communiqu. to him on May 31. Since then he had labored tacttul17 and had 
2?Ibid •• IV, 1224, in "Roosevelt to Lodge," June 16. 1905. 
... eel towud gettillg the belligerentll together, in ap1te ot the cl1tt1culUe. 
OYer the .eet1Dg place aad plea1pot .. t1ariea t power.. No woader he could ex-
Cla1lll "Ob lonU I haYe Mea growing nearly 118.4 1D the ettort to get Ruea1a 
&ad Japan togataer. Japall baa a right to ask a good deal and I do not thiDk 
her damanda exoe .. iye, btlt Rwuaia is 80 soddenly .tupid and the Gove!'Dment i. 
nch an uorphoua aftair that they really do not know.!b!1 they want. tt28 Roo-
.e.elt l • last aove betore the tir.t meeting ot the delegate. was to try anel a 
cure an al"IIi..tioe between the be111gerenta. The Ruea1ans wanted one as the,' 
teared that Japan would onlT continue to nibble awar at Ruaaian terri tory dur-
. 
1ng the negotiationa. Actually Japan did besin to oooup,. the island ot Sakha-
lin during the earl,. part ot the conterence.. Boose •• lt tailed to get the ar-
lIi.tice but he was not .urpri.ed at hi. tailure, as he pointed out to 1feJU7 
Cabot Lodges "At Ruaaia '. reque.t I asked Japan tor an armistice, but I elid. 
not expeot that Japan would graat it, although I ot course put the reque.t as 
stronglJ as poeaible. Inde.d I cannot ..,. that I reall,. bl .. e Japan tor not 
granUag it, tor she i. aaturally atraid. that mapanimity on her part would be 
lliainterpret.d. and turned to 'bad .. count against her • ..29 
Iinally all the delegat •• gathered aael 10088yelt welcomed thn abroad the 
Presidential J8.cht, the nu:fiow,r. where he tact~ arranged tor a .tand1q 
28.DQ!., IV, 12.58, "Rooeeyelt to Whitelaw Reiel," June 30, 1905. 
29.na£., IV, 1272, "Ioo.eyelt to Lodge," JulJ ll, 190.5. 
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buffet luncheon and then toasted the Japane.e and iuesian emperors in sueh a 
way that no nolation of protocol c01l1d poaa1bl1 be conceived. 
:Roosevelt left the belligerents alone: the BUeeese or failure of the 
Conference was dependent on th_. At last the Portaaouth Conference had. be-
gIII1 OIl a eala if not an •• peeialll hopeful aote. 
CHAPTER III 
It IIIl7 .... an 1UU1eceBBal'1 break iA our ll8.17ati ... e to diaeU88 the perBOD-
all ti_ of the actors in this 41'_, but actuall, such 8Jl explanation, iA the 
oase of the Portsllouth Conf.renc., gO.8 a lonc w81 towarde explaiDiq the pro-
c.edings _d t1Bal. outcome of that Coaterence. For this reason 8011e tilH s 
b. 4 .... ote4 to the8e men an4 their part 111 the PortBllOUth Conterenoe. As 1'rler 
Dermett .. ,..: "The persona.l. equation .nter'd 80 lar.el1 into s1 tuatiOD that 
on. i. otten rem1Jl4ed ot how quickly the relatioae of .tate. re.ol.... thea-
.. l ... e. iAto p8l"80nal relatioras. ,,1 1'b.e doainaat p8rsonali t, of cour... was 
!!l.odore Iooa ..... lt, who dil"ecte4 the "ahow." ioose .... lt was the informal w:r 
of a.oidiJag the replar diploaatic channels _d of depending OIl his tri.enda 
for hi. diploutio 'buille.. aad erraad-boy footwork. Perhaps hie lIethod was 
lIore .tf.cti.. thaD t11. wsual rigid cliploaatic oourse. In a wq it waa foroH 
on h1II by the death of John Ha7. 111s Secretar;y of State. "either., nor bi. 
lNee •• or, Elihu Root, took 8Jl1 part 111 the Port_outh ConfereDoe; but, e1'eIl 
if Roose1'e1t had Dot had to be his own Seoretar,r ot Stat. he probab17 would 
ha •• run roupahod O1'er the repllll" prooedure. What .... er II1gbt be said, pro 
or con, eoncerD1ns hia lIethod, it was etfective--trom the dispute over the 
place ot meeting and the power8 ot the delegates to the 8igoiag of the ~at,.. 
" Oace the dispute oyer the powers of the plenipotentiaries had be_ set-
tled, the respectiye goyernm_ts f1nal11 published the name. of their repre-
s .. taU "e.. '!he tomer Mi.n1.ter ot J'i.nance and "peace-part," un, Serge 
Witte, was the first Ruaa1an c1elegate. 81. _istant was Baro. Roman ltoaen 
vho ha4 r .. e .. t11 bee. appointed to succeed the ditticult and lJing Count Cas-
a1n1 as Bwudan Am'buador to the United states. Baron Jutaro lComura was ap. 
po1ated first Japanese plenipotentiary, with Iogoro !akabira, the Japanese 
Mlaister to Waahingtoa, as •• oond delegate. Aa lIe.tioned betore, Vi tt. and 
Ioae. -tuallJ ha4 t\lller powers than their opponent., !omura and Takahira. 
but the d1JUllD1- of the Rwsaian delegate., ~d particularly that ot Witte, 
.. to be tar 1I0re etteotlllll than U7 pover •• 
Serge Witte vas a ... ber ot the old gward and def1ni tel1 not OIle of the 
Czar's t.yorite.. Ue bad tought for the peaceful p8netl"atioa of Manohuria 
when the Court ad the Cur backed tho.e who wanted 1I11itarJ toroe used for 
"'e1"Oi81 expauiOJl i. that terr1tol7. Vitte bad lett the soYel"llllent and, 
as has alread7 bee. seen, he worked for peace .. IlUCh as he dared; but, the 
Japan .. e rebuffed hill as 'being a MIl vi thout infl"ence. In the end the Czar 
wu alIIost forced to choose Vi tt. .. the others to whoa he had ottered the job 
ha4 refused. tearing that 0D.l.1 failure at Portaaouth and diatayor at haae 
would reward. their etfort.. Jfo one wanted to take 08 wch a thankle .. job, 
except Vi tte who saith "If the Czar will uk it ot .. personall,., I shall be 
reaq to 10 to America.,t2 Vitte·. condition was accepted and he tound hi.elf 
the tiret plen1potenti&r1, • man without frienda, the -8111 of the Czar ad 
the Ili.lit&r7 set and the revolutiOD.U'1es at horae, as well as ot the vat _ .. 
jori t, ot the public in the tJai te4 States and 111 other part. ot the vestern 
world. As 111 tte said to OI1e ot bia confidants a "I have been chosen not 80 
muoh to reader a .ervioe to rq OOUl'lU7-as tigurativel1 speaking-to stWlble 
and break: flY neck. !he" reallJ vant to go on with the war. It is calculated 
that the chaDc .. ot rq strikiJas up a peace on really acoeptable conditiou are 
aperlative17 alight. ad that 1D all poaa1b1lit1. theretore. I shall tail. 
then I shall be dead and buried."' !he Czar's one instruction to Witte vaal 
"Not one square hoh ot Russia soU. Dot oae kopek ill tribute_"" Witte 0 ... 
to his alaoat hopele.. task with 80IIe soh_. ud plus 1D his IId.D.d. 
I resolyed to baa. rq tactics 011 the toUov1aa principles C (1) 
lot to show that we were 1D the least aax10ua to ltake peaoe, and 
to ooaY.,- the 1apreaa1on that it His Maj_t, had COllSeate4 to 
the nesotiationa, it waa .erell because ot the uniTereal desire 
on the part ot all countries to aee the war ternd.aated, (2) to 
act as heli tted the representati ye ot the p"eateat empire 011 
earth, \U1CI1_8Jed ., the tut that that ad.ghty eap1re had be-
cOIle 1I1volved temporar117 in a sUght dittioultJa (3) in 'fiew 
ot the treDl4tJldoWi 1ntlueDOe ot the pftu in AIIerica, to ehov it 
.. eJ'7 attent1011 and to be acceaaible to all 1ta repftsentat1ves, 
(4) to behaYe with deaooratio s1apJJ.01t" an4 witAollt a ahatlov ot 
_o~biabn .... eo as to win the S1flP8.thJ ot the Americ ... ; (S> in 
new ot the oonsiderable innueDce ot the Jen 0JIl the pre. azul 
on other aspects ot American Ute, .apecially in Nev York, not 
to exb:1b1 t alQ' host1l1 t1 toward th_.-wh1ch OOl1GUO~ ... entire-
17 ia keeping with rq op1nion ot the Jewish probl... • • • • • • 
• ,. • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • I took ..... t eve 
.. tnat aU the .erio_ wi til .. I o .. e into contact with the 
.... , e1IIp1101t, ot ...... 'Dd.a Mllav.l.OUJ' wu a heaYJ' stn1a 0Jl 
me as aU .. ~ 18 to the UDaC0U8toae4. but it aure17 va worth 
the tl'Ouble.' -
'niUon, IqliM', 2~. 
4Qvoted in Basad-Be,. !19h2lM Y.. 159. 
'w.t.tte, Mno1m. 139-140. 
Aad it do.s appear that Witte bad early won the illpreu10aable Rooeevelt to 
hi. 81de. Rooe ... lt expreued hi. pl.asure at WitH'. appointlHDt.6 thoush h. 
later gav. his opinion ot the heacl Rwudan del.gat. in 1 ... jo1OWl t."..., 
"Witt. irapr .... d ID. INCh whil. h. was h.re, but bl no Hue altogether pl.eaaoo-
ant17 •••• he also 1mpreaaed .. with being very much more concerned tor hi. 
own weltare than tor the weltare ot hi. nation. aDd as be11l8 utter11 c7Dical. 
untl"Uthtul and UD8C1'Up1ll.oue ... 1 
The other pl.m.poteD.tiar1 tor iuea1a, Baron Rosen. received ldndller 
handling fI'om Rooeevelt. though Wltte did not think too INch of his colleague. 
In hi. Mfito1D Witte wrote of Bonn: "Ue ~cl the lMC110cre intelligence ot a 
lJaltio Gel'll8D and the maDIlera ot a })Vfeet pntleman.'.8 M wi.1.1 1M .. en, Boo-
.. elt called Rosen into hi. contid_ce at the cncia! lIOIlent of the Conte ... 
ence. Roaen vas efticient and be did hi. job well; but, ainoe he vas the a.-
ond d.l.gate, and tbat to the showman Witte, h. is of'teD puaed oyer without 
INch .. tioa. Atter the Porlaouth Conference Ro.en continued a .Ru881aa Ie-
buaaclor to Wahineton. to the real pleasure ot Prea1d.nt Roosevelt. 
Whil. INCh can be Aid and vr1 tta about the Rusa1u delegat •• , the Jap-
an ... , thouIh ju.t as ab1. and ecboolecl in the tactio. of cl1Plotao7, drew 1_ 
attention to th ..... 1v.. and their part in the Porteaouth Conference. As Ju-
taro KoIIura, the tint Japm ... plenipotent1al7, and Kogol"O fakahira, h1a .... 
a1atut and the theu Japan ... M1n1at.1" to 1IIa.h1n,-on, ina1ated on absolute 
6aoo ...... lt. LltHA. IV. 1276. "Roos ... 1t to Me,.",. tt Jul7 18, 190'. 
1~., Y, 61-62. "Roo •• velt to Spring Rice," Nov. 1. 190'. 
8W1 tt.. !fpIo1£!. 136. 
secrecy concerning the conference seaeioDa, the,. kept aloof from the preas. 
Though th87 vere silent concerning themselves Roosevelt wrote in hiah praiae 
ot them and their oonduct. Be admired the Japanese in general and expressed 
bis special adlliration for these two representatives of the Japanese Govern-
ment. 
'!hue ''big tour'1 .enerallJ respected Rooaevelt in his efforta to secure 
peaoe, though Witte and Roaen both expressec1 the opinion that the,. did not .ee 
vlQ' Roosevelt telt that peace wu 80 imperative tor Bussia.9 
But theae vere not the onl7 persons to pla7 important pe.rta in the Oon-
terence. A fev vorda JlRlBt be said about Tb.eodore Roosevelt' a "Tennia Cabi.-
net." In a vtq the delegatea or plenipotentiaries diacuaaed aboYe vere the 
puppeta in the shov vh1le the member. ot RooaeYeltts "'lennis Cabinet" were the 
lien who pulled the plenipotentiaries' atrings. As most people do not PIA'1 at-
tention to those who manipulate the stringa. but on!,. watch the puppeta, 80 
II8Jl1 IIlight pa88 over these minor charactera when, in reality. the,. are alaoat 
more iaportant. It the personal element enters between Roosevelt and the ple-
nipotentiaries, it entera muoh more between Roosevelt and his "Temlia Cabi-
net." Perhaps the easiest Vtq to approach a d1.acuasion ot this "Cabinet" i. 
to take RoOilevelt's various relations with each oountr,. and see the I18n vho 
are involved. TAu. the infiuence ot the u'l'ennia Cabinet" will be brought out. 
Mention baa alreaq been _de ot Count Cusini. the Russian Aabaaaador to Waeh-
ingtont Roosevelt could BOt vork with this 1IaD., mainl.r beo_e he vas aure 
that he could not trust him. 'l'ha haaidant tinallJ b,.-pused Caas1ni alto-
39 
gather and worked directly with Ambassador George Meyer at St. Petersburg. 
Later Baron Rosen would succeed Cassin much to the relief of Roosevelt, but 
until he did, and even afterwards, Roosevelt depended on George Von LeDgerke 
Meyer, whom he had sent to St. Petersburg. He had removed Robert S. McCor-
llick, a politically valuable person but a diplomatic failure, and had sent 
.yer to Russia with the remark: ''Now, at St. Petersburg, I want sOlle work 
done, and 10U are the man to do it. It happens to be the onlf _baas,. at 
which I do want work done just at present. ,,10 Ambassador Meyer was really the 
only man in the official diplomatic .ervice whom Roosevelt used. And Meyer 
did not fail Roosevelt. As will be seen, i~ was Me1el" who handled the Czar 
so well during the crucial days of the deadlock in the Conference. 
!be President had a aimilar connection with the Japane.e in the person of 
Baron Kentaro Kaneko. Kaneko had been e4ucated in the United States, at Bar-
Yard, and he knew American _ys. It is a bit surprising that he did not play 
up to the American pre_, as Witte did; but, he served as a valuable go-be-
tween in ways which the diplomatic code would bave ruled out tor anyone of an 
ofticial raDk. Roosnelt wrote to hill after the Conference: "Iou have ren-
dered lie invaluable assistance b1 the wa7 in whioh you have enabled lie to 
mow, and alao b1 the way iJl which ,.ou have enabled me to conve,. to ,.our own 
govenment certain things which I thought it desirable to have known and which 
I hardl7 cared to forward through official channels ... 11 As in the oase of 
Russia when Roosevelt b,.-passed Cassini and Witte. for the latter at least 
l~sevelt. LetteU. IV, 10'79, "Roosevelt to Meyer," Dec. 26, 1904. 
~oted in Dennett, RoM.YeIt, 36. "Rooseyelt to Kaneko," Sept. 11, 1905. 
oonsidered himself by-passed,12 so the President had no contact with the Amer-
ioan Minister to Japan, Lloyd C. GriscOll. 
Diplomatically England's relation to the United States was sosewhat simi-
lar to that of Russia. Roosevelt did not tind hillSelf able to work with Sir 
Mortimer Durand, the Briti.h Ambassador to Washington. though he found him a 
nice old man and quite sociable. Likewise. Roosevelt sidestepped hi. own All-
buaador to the Court of Saint J .... , Whitelaw Reid. And yet Roosevelt would 
complain bitterly when Britain would not .end hi. the maD he wanted when all 
the while he refused to work through their representative in Washington, and 
his in London. The man who. he wanted in Du:rand' s place was really the root 
cause of all his indirect .ethod. in dealing with England. Sir Cecil Spring 
I1ce was a very close friend of the President, a charter and intimate member 
ot the "Tennis Cabinet." "Springy·s" admiration tor Roosevelt W8.8 sincere, 
even if, or perhaps because, he could sayl "It you took an impetuQus small 
boy on to a beach .trewa with a great many eXCiting pebbles, you would not ex-
pect him to remain interested tor long in one pebble. You must always ruem-
ber that the Proeaident is about six. tt13 Otten Roosevelt would ask Spring Rice 
to come over tor a tew days, a unique request when we remember that Spring 
Rice was attached to the English embassy in St. Petersburg. Spring Rice deti-
nitely was valuableJ he was almost the only line of cODl'JlUnication between 
Washington and London, and quicker than any 1I0re direct channels. Ironically 
lZW:ltte, !!e!oirs, 166. 
13Quoted in A. Whitney Gri.wold, !!!!. l!!: Eastern Policy 2! l!!! Uni t,d 
States, (New York, 1938), 111, trom '!'he tetter, !!!! Friendships 91. !!!: Cecil 
~ Rice, ed. by Stephen O!qnn, 2 vola., h~oston, 1929-... this reference, It 
~ 
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Spring Rice vas made British Aabassador to Wasbinaton onl1 after Roosevelt had 
lett the White Bouse. 
France, too, is another example ot the Rooseveltian diplomac1 in action. 
/ The French Premier, Delcuae, was a perso!!! Don fEata to Roosevelt. 'l'his was 
due no doubt in part to the laiser's whisperings into the President's ear 
about Delcuse's and England's plans to torm a congress ot nations to settle 
the War. J'ortunatel1 the Frenoh Premier resigned on June .6 80 that lett the 
President ooapletel1 tree to deal with Franoe through another member ot hi. 
"fermi. Cabinet" Jule. Juaserand, the Frenoh Ambassador to the United States. 
Aaother "fenni. Cabinet" member was Hermann Speok Von Sternberg, the Ger-
un Ambassador to the United States. Again, Roo.evelt seldom _de muoh uae of 
his repre.entative at BerliB. _baasador CbarlelllllP1e Tower. "Speck, tt as 
Spring Rioe and Jugerand, though attached to foreign governments, was 10181 
to hi. friend aDd performed invaluable .enice to Roose ... el t as well as to the 
Iai.er and VOIl Bulow. the German Iaperial Chanoellor. 
A word in passing about other. who were silent partners to the President 
would include suoh un as Mel ... ille Stone, corr.spondent for the Maociated 
Press. and John C. O'Lauplin, .pecial corre.pondent tor the ehieNo Tribune. 
Another t1})8 of Roos ..... ltian diplomac,- was oftered by Secretary ot War, Taft. 
when the latter conclud.d the highl1 secret Tatt-Katsura Agreem.nt on Jul,- 29, 
1905. ru. qreem.nt, concluded in the dog dq. of the Port_outh Cont.rence. 
alDIost gave United Stat •• ' approval to Japan's dominion over Korea, while the 
Japanese declared that they had no designs whatso ..... r towards the Philippines. 
Wi th all the "machinery" set up tor 8IDOOth running the Conference was 
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ready to start, and start it did shortly after Roosevelt got the delegates to-
gether at q,ster Bay before they set out for Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The 
sessions had been switched to Portsmouth because of the extreme summer heat of 
'Washington. 
In all there were twelve major se •• ions and a few private meetings betwe 
Komura and Witte. The first eight meetings constitute the first part of the 
Conference, and the final four the last part during which fheodore Roosevelt 
intervened directly. Atter the welcome on August " there was a short de~ 
until August 10 when the first formal seasion was held. At this time Japan 
preaented her terms of peace; 
I. Russia to acknowledge that Japan possesses iJ1 Corea [sicil 
pa1"8JIOWlt political, ad.litary, and economical interests and Rus-
sia to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures of 
guidance, protection, and control which Japan tina it necessary 
to take iJ1 Corea, 
II. bssia to evacuate Manchuria within a spttCified period 
aad to relinquish all terri torial advantaps and all rights of 
occupation and all preferential and exclusive concessions and 
franohises in that region in impairment of Chinese sovereipt, 
or inooneistent with the principle of equal opportunity. 
Ill. Japan to ;osstor. to China Manchuria subject to the guar-
antee of reform and improved adllinistration; 
IY. Japan and Rusa1a reciprooall, to engage not to obstruct 
aD1 general .easure. cOllllon to all countries which China ~ 
take for the development of the commerce and industries of Man-
ohuria, 
V. Russia to transfer and &ssign to Japan the lease of the 
Liaotung PeniJ1aual; 
VI. Russia to assip to Japan the Harbin-Port Arthur railwan 
VII. Russia may retain and work Trans-Manchurian railw&1 sub-
ject to condition that the AIle is to be _ployed exclus1vel1 for 
oOllllercial and industrial purposes; 
VIII. Russia to cede to Japan Sakhalin and the appurtenant is-
lands; 
IX. Russia to P&1 to Japan an indemnity sufficient to oover 
the actual expenses of war; 
x. v.ladivostock to be dismantled and to be made essentially 
a commercial port and Japan to have the right to station a con-
sul there; 
XI. The naval strength of Russia in the Extreme East hereaf-
ter not to exceed ____ tons; 
XlI. Russia to surrender to Japan as lawful prizes all vessels 
of war which sought asylum in neutral ports in consequence of in-
juries received in battle and were there interned, 
XIII. Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full fishery rights 
along the coasts and in the bays, harbours (§iQ) t inlets, and 
rivers of her possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering 8eas.14 
Such were the terms which surprised others besides the Russians, as al-
most everyone expected the Japaneae terms to be much more moderate and in ac-
cord with their totally different and suppoaedly more altruistic pre-war aims. 
At firat Roosevelt was reticent with regard to Japan's terms, particularly the II 
indemnity and the cession of Russian territo~y.15 Only later did he express 
his approval of Japan' a receiving an indemn! t;y and terri tory. The American 
public, particularly. were t-.ken aback by Japan t a demand for the recogni tion 
of her complete domination over Korea, her demand for an indemnit;y for the 
oosta of the war, and also her demand for terri tory. The Japanese stand on 
Korea was completely unexpected as she had so long professed such high motives 
concerning the Hermit Empire. Actually official circles felt otherwise. as 
was seen in the Taft-KAtaura Agreement. Japan, no doubt, added a number of 
fairly innocuous proposals which she could later magnanimously withdraw; but, 
still four of the proposals met with Russia's disapproval. These dealt with 
the limitation of the Russian Navy, the return of interned ships, the indemni-
l4Quoted in Dennett, aooseveit, 231-232. 
l5Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Shown in His Own Let 
!!!:!. 2 vols •• (New York, 1920), It 380-381, !:'Rooseveltto ""Taft, "Apr; W. -
1905. 
t,.. and the ceseion ot Sakhalin. Even before the Russians attacked these de-
mands Witte cleverl,. made the auggestion that Japan and Bussia enter a mutual 
agreement which would 1naure their respective interests in Korea, Manchuria, 
and even in China. But lCoIIura as .ell as Laudortt, the Jbt.a1an M1n1ster ot 
Foreign Attairs, turned dow this proposal; and, Witte turned back to the pro-
posals tor peace. Actuall,. wi thin two years Japan and iussia were to tollow 
Witte's proposal ot a mutual interest pact. In the tirst eight sessions the 
other terms were easi17 adjusted to the satistaction ot both partie •• and Ja-
pan hinted that the clauses about the interned ships and the l1a1tation ot the 
Ruman Far .. tern neet could be just as ~l,. solved as the,. were not ot 
extremely vital importance. But the provisioaa concerning the indeam1t,. and 
the cession ot Sakhalin ware a big que.tion mark. Neither aide would yield on 
the.e _tters, and b,. A.ugust 18 it looked as it Roosevelt's earl)' tears ot 
tailure were SOO11 to be realized. By this time Rooseyelt was ready to npport 
Japan in her demands tor lIOI1e,. anel land, ttl th1nIt I can get the Japanese to 
abanelon two ot the propoaed articles. But there will ha .... to be SOIle indemni-
t,. under acme name, and 1t i. madness tor the Busaians to expect the Japane.e 
to g1 ... e up Sakbal1n, which the,. haYe taken. tt16 Ruaeia'. tactics had made the 
Japanese refuse to agree to an aJ'JIIi.tice, and in the .. antime Japan had began 
It was at this time, atter August 18, that 'lb.eodore Roosev.lt personall,. 
ud quite directly intervened in the Conterence. Sorae criticize him tor this 
action, but the representative. ot both sides had asked him tor advice in the 
l6Dennett. ioo.evelt, 251 not., "Roosevelt to Preeident Eliot of Har-
Yard," Apr. 16, 1905. 
crisis; and, apparently, his previous and indirect influence on the Conference 
had not been very effective, particularly as the first part ended in complete 
stalemate. Tne last four sessions of the Conference. including some special 
extra meetings, makeup the second part and are almost a unit in themselves. 
1be stalemate over the indemrd. ty and the cession of Sakhalin probably 
would have ended the Conference had not Roosevelt actually intervened when he 
did. Japan's tlextra" proposals concerning the limitation ot the Russian Navy 
and the treatment ot interned Russian warships were easily disposed ot, leav-
ing the two big problems unsolved and without a solution in sight. A brief 
consideration of these two issues is neces-.ry for an understanding of their 
significance and weight in the closing sessions, as vell as Roosevelt's intlu-
ential part in the Conterence crisis. 
!be cession ot Sakhaljn was considered by most to be practically a 1!!1 
accompli. especially as Japan had begun to occupy the island; but, the Czar 
would not compromise in the least-tiNct one square inch ot Russian soil.rtl7 In 
addition to the plain tact that Japan actually vas occupying Sakhalin, another 
element was hesYily in Japan's tavor--Sakhalin Island had been under'Japanese 
sovereignty until some thirty years previous to the Russo-Japanese War. The 
Russian delegates' Yiews of the cession ot Sakhalin were not exactly those ot 
the Cur, tor as Rosen put ita 
As regards the first of theae points we had no difficulty in coming 
to the conclusion that in the presence ot irremediable facts and 
conditions this point could not be successfully carried in its en-
17Ct. Page 38, note 4. 
tLret" and that we abould be empowered to oons.nt in this re-
card to nch cOIlcemona as circwastances IIdght rend.r nec .... 
882"1. We bad. indeea, to take into consideration the tao", that 
the Japanese had alreaq invaded Sakhalin, that our small garri-
eon, largell outnWlber", had surrendered, and that in caee ot a 
continuation ot the war, "e should unquestionably be deprived ot 
the pouib1li ty ot noonquer1n.g the lo.t terri tol'1 on the islanet, 
the Japaa .. e having b, the destruction ot our tleet secured abso-
lute oOlllllalld ot the .ea. 'the question, there tore , reduced i taelt 
to this I whether it would be justifiable to render the coaclusion 
of peao. dependent OIl our adhering llDOOllprOJlis1D.Sl1 to this point 
of our 1aatructioBIJ, a que.tir which w. both agreed could 01117 
be anawered iB the a.ptive. 
And Witte at this tllll. expre.sed hi. mind to the Czar through Lamsc!ortt: 
I beliewe that att.r the Conter.nce, when the world l.aru what 
happened there, the peace-loving public opinion will recognize 
that lblsa1a vas right 111 refusing to pq a war indemait,. but 
it will not side with us OIl the subj.ct: of Sakhalin, for the 
tacts are .vonger thaD arswaent.. ,. a .tter ot fact, Sakha-
l1n i. in the handa ot the Japane.e, and we ha ... e no meana to re-
oover it. eouequently it we wiab the tailure ot the Coaference 
to be laid to Japan, we JlN8t not retuse to cede Sakhalin, ttter 
."ina refuse4 to iadeaaif7 Japan tor her war expenditure. 9 
Oa Aupst 22 the Czar repliea: ftIn view ot this Bi. Maje.t, baa ordered 
lOU to ce .. e further coatereace. with Japane.e delegate., if the latter are 
aot .-powered to dell1.t trOll the exce.aive d8llHU1u whioh the, are now _Idag. 
'.rhus the n.gotiation. are b.ing broken off becau.e of the iatractab1li t1 of 
the Japane.e as reaarda the que.tion of indemnitie., ve must stop then and 
thel'te. tJIlder the •• oonditioaa, the further diaouaaioJl ot the altogether 1aad-
II1saable ceu101l ot Sakhalin becomee UJUleceN&J7. *0 'l'h1s J'epll f:roII the Czar 
vas not altogether DtaYarable in npri. to the oe.siOll ot Sakhal:ln, but the 
l8Roaen, 791'\: Tear •• I, 263. 
19w:Ltw. K1p!ek!, 155. 
2OQuoted iB Vitte, !legi", 155. 
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Czar hinted. at hi. plaJing the one i.Ae agai.ut the other. Regardleae ot how 
noh IIOre nexi.b1e the Czar .e.ed he was not jokiag about break1ng off the 
oonference •• 
The 1e8ue ot the indemni 10, • .,oked aJl e.,a .ore unequi. vocal ansver troll 
Nicholas than bad the ce.ion ot terr1tol"1. J.a has bea Hft, Roo.eve1t. at 
firet reticent about the indeDl'l'li.t,. later c_e out openlJ in ita fa.,or.21 In 
late JulJ there were chance. that Ru.sia would readi.lJ agree to J)81 8011' IIOlle, 
tor prisoner upkeep aa well .. other eXpell8es. At that t1 .. 1n writing to 
Baron laBeko, 1too • ..,e1t cautioned the Japane.e about the tel'll "1ndeamitJ"* "1 
had word trom Franca that Wi. tta bas said. he would not pq aD indeai. 10,. 1 
ha.,e recei.,ed another cable etatina that he said he would not pa'f an indeJlQit7 
but would couider paying at leut part of Japu'8 expeues 1D. the war. I a 
geat there tore that great oare 'be uaeel about the word udemnit1 and that if 
poaeibl. 1t 'be a.,oided • ..22 
Meanwhile the Czar' a 1ntranailUO' did not help to quiet the European po 
era who startHtalJdD, about a world congreu to •• tt1e what Portaaouth, ap-
parentl,. could DOt do.23 It was at this oruclal lIlOIlent, August 18, that 100-
.e.,e1t began hi. direct 1ntenention bl •• 'DI Baron Rosen to cOIle to o,eter 
Ia7 to talk o.,er the a1tuatioD. S1mul.taneoual1 nth the President'a action 
W1tte proposed a OOllp1"OllliS. to the Japan.se. Ita exact nature ia not Down 
but 1t dealt nth SakhaliD and reillbU1"8et1enta.24 On the 19th Rosen saw Roo.e-
21Rooaa."lt, LItten, IV, 1253. "Roesf1'le1t to 'lower, If June 24, 1905. 
22loo •• .,elt, lAttera, IV, 1293. "Roosevelt to lCaneko," Jul1 29. 1905. 
23n.lUlett, BoH..,el t. 251, 265. 
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velt and the latter proposed a compromise ver'! simlai' to that which Witte had 
made on the 18th. !he President suggested that Sakhalin be divided and the 
Russians paJ a sum tor the land which they would receive. RooseYelt thought 
that this would give time for all to cool down since the money matter would be 
taken care ot atter the Portaouth Con terence • 
'.ftds was the DIOIHnt whert. to all the previous reasons _entioned tor peace 
there was one more strong motive addeds !beodore Rooseyelt's determination to 
get peace. Add to this determination the tact that all the neutrals wanted 
peace, including France who would give no further help to Ru .. ia particularly 
since she herself was getting embroiled in ~rocco. JUrthermore lrance looked 
hopetully to Russia tor aid apinst GeI'lD8J11 in the West and in Atrica. MeaD-
while Genumy wanted peace and she teared that the reYolutioDa1"1 spirit ramp-
ant in Rusaia would spread to her own haae territory_ Another interested 
part,. England, wuted its ally, Japan, to stop fighting, while the United 
State. hated war and wanted the balance ot powerful peace re.tored in the Far 
East. Add all these tacta together and peace is seen to be inevitable. Be-
aides all his national and international interests, iooseveltts personal pride 
was beginning to pla1 no small part in his exertions tor a auccessful conclu-
sion to the eo.terence. 
'l'b.e Preside.t began his direct action on August 18 with his reque.t that 
Rosert COIle to conteI' with him. Dr the 21st the situation looked no better, 
wi th the Czar retuaing to yield an inch ot ground or a kopek ot IIOne,. .0 mat-
tel' what it was called. On the 21st ioosevelt cabled Ambassador Meyer in St. 
Petersburg to approach the Czar and tell him Roosevelt's view on the situa-
tion. Roosevelt spoke frankly sbout Japan's revised demands and ended by say-
ing tbat he hoped that the Czar would have similar wi" views • .25 At the same 
tiae Roosevelt aent Juaserand and Von Sternberg a copy ot his letter to the 
Czar and asked their help in persuading the Czar to yield. He also wrote to 
Baron Kaneko along these lines for communication to his home sovernment urging 
the Japanese to make peace and not to make it appear as it Japan vere fighting 
solely for the indemn1tl • .26 He quickly sent a aecond message to Kaneko the 
next day, August 23, reiterating his stand on Japan'a apparent tight for an in-
demnitJ • .27 Ora the 23rd he also wrcte to Ambaasador Durand, to Meyer, and to 
Herbert Peirce, an assistant secretary of state, who was to inform Witte ot 
the President's views. Then tbe only thing he could do was to sit bl and wait 
for the reaults of his first direct action. 
Ora August .23 Meyer was able to obtain an audience with the Czar and deliv-
er Roosevelt's measage. !his direct action with the Czar was the only ~ to 
get his true opinion as hie aderUngs, Cauini and Lamsdorff. were afraid to 
approach the Czar and to deliver Rocaevelt's .. uages. 1'his is jut another 
proof not only of how effective but also how necessary was Roosevelt's indi-
rect diplomacy. Meyer gave the Preaident an accolUlt of his meeting with the 
Czar, who no doubt, meant this meeting to be his ultimatum; but, Meyer clever. 
ly interpreted this ultimata in a Dlore favorable Ught. 'fhe Czar had, at 
.2'aoosevelt, Lettera, V, 4-5, in "Roosevelt to Lodge,·' Sept • .2, 1905. 
26!W., IV, l309, "Roo.evelt to Kaneko. 1f Aug • .22, 1905 • 
.27~., 1312-1313. "Roosevelt to Kaneko," Aug. 23, 1905. 
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last, begun to yi.ld. He would allow the Japanese to keep the southern balt 
ot Sakhalin and would pay a reasonable amount for its retrocession and for 
pri.oner upkeep. Meyer wrote to the President: 
Clos.ted with the Emperor two hours. at the end of which ti.e he 
intoraed me ot the terma on which he would conclude peace. Ac-
c.ptanc. of the .ight points substantially agr •• d upon by the 
plenipot.ntiaries at Portsmouth. (no?) pa:ment ot war indemnity 
but a 11beral and g.nerous pqment for care and maintenance of 
Ruasian prisoners but not such a sum as could b. interpreted tor 
a war indemnity, withdrawal of Japan's claims tor intel"ned shipe 
and 111111 tatioD of J18val power 1D the Pacific, Russia to poasess 
Dorth half ot Sakhalin while Japan to retaa southern halt (that 
portion which formerly belong.d to Japan.}'o 
WIle the plenipotetiari •• IMt on Augu.t 23. little beiD.g mown ot the 
Czar t s latest .... ag.. Witt. mad. a .tart11~ ott.r to K.omura; Japall .hould 
Nta1n allot Sakhalin and receive no indeDlJ11ty.29 KorIura r.tus.d. and this 
was just what Witte had hoped he would do, tor it then appeared that the Japa-
n •• e were clearly fighting tor the indeami ty_ As Japan could not have peace 
with an iDdemnity she vould hav. war without on •• 3O Meanwhile, b.tor. the 
next COIlterence •• seiOD. Roo.evelt WI'Ote to Meyer to clear up the s1tuatiOll 
that had reeulted from .easag •• between Washington and Meyer, and also to put 
pre.sure on the Czar tor immediate actioD tor peace.31 
OIl the tollowing dq, Auguet 26. the Conterence .et tor what app.ared to 
b. ita last .ession. iiitte had _de it appear that the Japane •• were fighting 
28Ioos..,.elt. Letter!1t Y, 5-6, in "RoGan.lt to Lodge, ff Sept. 2, 1905. 
29Denn• tt , Roosev.lt, 257 • 
.3OZabriski• t R1 vtla t 126-127, 134 !lot •• 
31Roosev.lt, !Atter!. V, 6-8. in "Roos •• elt to Lodge," Sept. 2, 1905. 
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cml.7 for the 1ndemni t" and he vas prepared to make 1 t appear _ 1f Japan were 
the sole cause of the Conference·s failure. At th1s aeas10n Witte propoeed 
le.. than he had three daya prevloual1 when it had been all of Salchal i D and 
no iJldemnit1 to Japan, DOW it was the diY1a1on of Sakhalin and DO iadeumit,. 
Atter this lut otter Witte threatened to break ott the negotiations 1mmed1-
atel,f. Sf the 27th, atter a week ot Roosevelt'. ettorts, the Conference 
MelDed to have pinea nothing. l"he a1tuation was no better than betore. The 
Czar, 1 t 1s true, had begun to yield but nothing IDUch had come of his al1lht~ 
II01"e tavorable attitude. Actuall.J, as tlU" u he WIllI concerned. Nicholas did 
not mean to yield at all. Be was sa aduumt as eYer. So d1rect negotiation, 
OIl the Preeident'. part, hacl .... ed to accomplish llttle, azul, aa hi. onlJ al-
ternative, be now started to exert more intensive indirect presaure. 
All ot hia .ttorta to move England to exert pl"eaaure on Japan seemed Iii 
tailure, 'but on the 27tb &n.gland rele .. ed tor publlcation the very recent re-
neval. ot the Azaglo-Japane .. Alliance. Thia vas, at least, indirect aid. On 
the 27th Rooeevel t cabled the lCaiaer I 
Peace can be obtained on the fol.l.owina terma I lluuia to pa:t 1\0 
iad..u. t1 whate .. er and to recet ve back north half ot Sakbalin 
tor which it 1e to PIA7 to Japan what .... r 8IIOunt a mixed comi.s-
don 11&1 deterr.dn.. ru. 1. ay propoe:i tiOD. to which the Japa-
n ... have __ ted reluctantly and o.nl7 under atrong preaavre 
frOID .. e. !he plan i. for each of the contendiq parties to nam. 
an equal nUllHr of Il8lllbera of the cOlllldss1on and for themselvea 
to Dame the odd member. • • • 
1"b ... tenta which atrike 1M as extremel,f moderate I have not pre-
HIlted 1n this form to the Ruae1an &peror. I teel that JOU have 
more intluence vi th hi. than e1 ther I or arqone elae can have. • 
• • Can 10\1 not take the intiative bl presenting these terms at 
oace to b1m1 tour su.cce~iD the matter v.Ul make the entire oiv-
Weed world YOW" debtor. 
i I 
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But all to no avail. Meyer wrote Booae..-elt on the 26th and on the 27th 
reiterat1Ag the Czar's categorical replies." The end seemed at hand, but 
Roosevelt still did not give up. Had he done 80 the Conterence might have 
broken up days betore. The President appealed once more to the Japanese and 
he approached the Kaiser again. He also sought French aid through Jus.erand. 
Meyer's cables, mentioned above, were only strengthened by the Czar's com.u-
nique of August 28 sent to Witte through Lamadorff: "Send Witte my command to 
end the discussions at all hazard tomorrow ... 34 
But by this time, Witte vas, perhaps, catching a little of the enthusiasm 
of Roosevelt. Be too wanted peace. From the first he had couidered his mis-
sion next to hopeless, but he seemed to want to .how e..-erybody that he could 
make the best of an iIIpoeaible situation. Whether pesce or more war Witte wu 
destined to tailure in the eyes ot IDaJ11 Ru8si8l18, particularly the Czar. So 
why not peace? Witte, as it were, reversed his superior's poadtionl 
Sut Witte. now in sight ot the goal, would not be trifled with in 
this wtq azq longer. He took th1Ags into his own hands and de-
cided on his reepou:1billty that he would not carry out the ... 
pel"Or's 1Astructions and break up the conference. It cost him a 
great etlort to lUke this resolve. Here is aa extract trOll the 
.eseage in which he announces it to t.madorff I 'Congruously with 
the 1utruotlO1l8 rece! ved we would break otf the negotiations to-
morrow and make due oOllllllUDication to the President. But in new 
ot the letter received trom the President which has been forward-
ed !e. extenso, and which calla for a reply from his Majesty, I 
oonsider it inadvi8able to end the sittings betore that reply has 
oome. I will try. therefore, unless the Jape raise difficulties, 
to postpone the tinal sittiq util that reply has come. With 
the Jape I think we have f1D1shed, but to break off before his 
33l!d:.t., Y, 8. in "Roosevelt to Lodge,tf s.pt. 2, 1905. 
34Quoted :1n Dillon. lellae, 310. 
Maj .. t,'1 answer is received would, I tear, be to ottend the Pres-
idftt.'" 
" 
'!he dela, was u .. 1e .. insotar as it wu expected to produce any ettect on 
the Czar, but it did g1.,e both side. time to CO o ... er the iaues at stake. '!'be 
tinal .e88ion met 011 'ru •• cIq, Aupat 29, and the Japaneae tac&d fA Witte who 
was now fUJlIUI'Iins an ....,....1ve position. He preaented a note to the Japan .. e 
4e1ept.. which stated that Ruaaia would not pIq &n7 1n4eam1 t,Y but that .e 
would paJ' a reasonable _ tor the pr18ODel'8' upkeep, and that. 
1'out.toia Sa. Majesti l·~reur. atin de donner UIl DOU't'eau 
t&mo1pqe de 80D ainclre dlair de oontr1'buer au r&tabl1 ...... t 
4e la pe1x en llxtr1me Orient, oOllae.t a o'der au JapOll 1.& partie 
sud de l'i1e de Sakhaline, i oon4ition que 1.& partie norde re.te 
en 1.& poaaeaa1oa de 1& Ru8818, san aUO'Wle oOllpenaation •••• 
• pN'MDtant oe projet ~ 1& oonGderation de. Pl~poten­
tiari.ea du Japoll, lea PlH1potentiar1ea de luaaie ont l'hoJmeur 
.. d_larer, sur 1 'oree de leur Augute Mahre. que oe proJet 
torme la dern1~1"e oOl1o ... ion que la_lluuie put ... t&ire cIau le 
but unique d'arriver i' une enteate.30 
fbe Japane.e oould take it or lea ... e it. Sinoe Witte's attempt to make 
the JapaDe.e look .. it thq are tighting in the Conterenoe and on the battl 
field just tor an indemn1t,., the Japan .. e bad done little and had 11ttle oppo 
tun1t,. to malee their position look better. It now appeared, thanka large17 to 
Witte, that the auoo ... or tallure ot the Portsmouth Conterenoe itaelf hinged 
" llWl., 309. 
36Quoted in Dennett, Roosvelt, 211, the following is a translation of 
the .bon part of the ... ian altiMtwa to Japan, Aug. 29. 190" 
Ria Majest" the .peror, 80 .. to oft.r ,.et another token ot hi. a1noere de-
a1re tor peaoe in the Far East. consent. to the oession of the BOuthern part 
of Sakhal1n to Japan without 8D1 other OcmpcmaatiOD, on the oond! t10n that the 
DOnhem part re.aiD a poaaua101l ot RwNd.a. • •• In preaent1ng thie otter 
tor tbe oODll1deration ot the Plenipotent1arie. ot Japan, the Buse1_ Plenipo-
tent1ar1 .. ha ... e the honor ot statiq, on the order ot their August Maetel', 
that this otter to:rms the last concesGon whioh Rusaia will be able to lMke 
tor the eole end of arriving at an agreement. 
I 
I I 
I , 
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oa the Japane.e. Atter all had. aot the Czar gracioualy consented to Jielcl 
vh .. he did DOt ha ... e to; ad, thill even though he bad been mol'. 1ielding a tev 
dqs betore ill his ottera. F:LnaUy the Japanese replied, according to an ere-
witae •• , as tollows: "At last loaura, in a well-controlled voioe, said that 
the Japane.e CIo ... ernaent, ha't'iq tor its a1a the restoration ot peace sad the 
bringing ot the aelOtiatioaa to a sucoessful oonclWJioa, ezpr .... d i til 0011-
a.at to Russia proposal to divid. Sakbal:ha ill tvo, without iademnity beiag 
.1. 
paid. Vitt. calltly replied that the Japane .. proposal vu aooepted and that :r 
the liAe ot demaJ"Catioa would be reckoned at the fittieth degree.,.)7 I, 
, , 
!hUll peaoe was procured and the lUIount ~t 1IOD..1 YU later arbitrated with I; 
Japaa reoei viag tY8J1t1 lI111ion dollars tor prisoDar of war expensell. Japaa 
bad r.ceiyed all that .h. bad real17 wanted, u.d Ruuia taced Ja1"8ll in the Far 
lut, .. Roolle ... elt had vanted. The final oOllpl'Oll1S. was RooseYelt's, though 
it is true that Vitte or JCoaura, acoording to SOlM, made similar propoaala ot 
which Iooseyelt was coaplet.ly unawar.. Iove ... er, Roosev.ltts ettorts and the 
dealiap ot the pleD1potentiarie. MODI the .. ely •• vere not the oal,. tactorll 
that _tared iato the final .aulta. As has Hen .eationecl, Roo.eyelt con-
atu.tlJ 8Ol1Iht the aid ot other cOUJltrie. in proouriDg peace. It is not out 
ot place here to CO into SOIM ot the.e Roo.e .... 1 tian foreign relattou, as th87 
are amother phase ot Roo ..... elt'. mediation at Portsmouth. 'the President'. 
IIOIIWhat llD1que .ethod ot coauaicatiou has alreaq b •• n d.scribed. Let 118 
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see what this system actualll achieved with two other countries which special-
ly enter into the Portsmouth scene, Germany and England. 
It is quite evident that Roosevelt never suspected the Kaiser's real mo-
tives in the Far East; he did not attribute aD1 but the most altruistio mo-
tives to the Kaiser. Roosevelt could write to Spring .Rice. ftThere is one 
thing I am a little puzzled at, and that is why excepting on disinterested 
grounds the German Emperor should want Russia and Japan to uke peace, he has 
done all he could to bring it about.,,38 And RooaeTelt could alao thank the 
Kaiser for his help and hia standing by the Preaident, but he did not have the 
slighteat iDkling of either the never-ratified Treaty of Bjorko of July 24, by 
which the Kaiser hoped to allJ himself with the Czar, nor of the meeting be-
tween the Czar and the laiser on August 28. At this latter ... eting the Czar 
agreed to pq. during the next five years, $500.000,000 to Japan. Apparentll 
neither Roosevelt nor aD1 of the Japane.e at Portsmouth had any knowledge of 
this agr .... nt. With this reported meeting the debate at Portsmouth appears 
under a nev light.39 
If Germarq and the Kaiser II1stified Roosevelt, the English and their pol-
iC1 were even more of an enigma to him. The Pr.aident vas absolutely aure 
that !bgland' s and our aims in the Far East were identical. This point and 
the available evidence to the contrary has already been presented.. Actuall7 
England's motives were not identical with ours; they were of a quite different 
nature. All tbrough the negotiations Roosevelt asked Spring .Rice to procure 
38.aooaeve1t. Letters, IV, 1286. "Roosevelt to Spring Rice," July 24, 1905 
'9Ch1cMo Tribune, Sept. 9, 1905. 1. 
u.ediate aid frOll his hOile govel"l'laent for the effeeting of peace, and the 
President often hinted at his suspicions of England's iDsiDcerit,y in the cause 
of peace, protestations to the contral'1 notwithstanding. 40 
'f71er Dennett pictures the aollewhat contwsing diplomatic cro_currents 
at this tille when he 8&1s: 
It is difticul t to resist the conclusion that President Roo-
sevelt had been wrong in his interpretation of British polic,.. 
IGglaad desired peace but I.nadowne tthe B:r1 tiah Sec"tary for 
Foreign Atfa1nij, having watched Roos .. el t through the first .ta-
ps of the Moroccan orisis, and having observed his willingness 
to uaiat the Kai.er out of an impossible position b7 urging on 
France the international conference, had 11 ttle confidence that 
the President understood EUrope.ell enough to Mak. a durable 
peace in the Far East. Certainl,. no fac.t was brought out in this 
letter [spring Rice to Roosev.lt OD. .gUsh po11ciJ which ade-
quatel,. explained wbJ Lansdowne with all propriet,y might not have 
apre.ed to Japan hi. disapproval of .000e of the demands which 
were being advanced. One COll.S to f •• l that perhaps the W.er 
vas not whoU,. wrong in his usertioY that hanc. andJ• F.curland 
would have be.n glad th .... lve. to be the peaoemaker •• ~l -
Be that .. it ma,., Roo .... l t vas disappointed at Sri taill'. "eponae to hi 
requests for ... i.tance. All for the Morocoan affair. while the Kai.er hoped 
that Roosevelt would sid. with hi. in the ".lltUal Algeeiras Conf.rence, which 
conv.n.d in Januar,- 1906, Roosevelt reluctantl,. stepped in and ultimatel,. aid-
ed with the British intere.ts. In the end, as has been lIention.d, Britain at 
least inclirect17 helped Roo.evelt b,. the ti •• l,. announcement of the "neval of 
the Anglo-Japane.e Alliance. Dennett alao point. out that the British Foreign 
Office had no intention of parti tiordng China and had not the alighteat bint 
'oaevelt. Letter,. IV, 1311; "Roosevelt to Durand." Aug. 23. 1905. 
1283, "Rooaevelt to Spring Rice," .lul,. 24, 1905. 
41Dennett, Rgosev.lt, 214. 
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of Japan'. dire n.ed for illmediate peace. 42 1'b1. latte.r point, surprising ... 
it a81 SMII'l, rAa7 explain such ot Bri tain '. seeming procrastination and iaac-
tio. in infiuencing Japan to lII1ke an early peace. 
Jut as the Russian Imperial lIleeting of August 28 IIl8.1 point to the Czar'. 
yielding, 80 also as Bovard Beale points out that, cOllIe what may, Japan, fro. 
the beg.lDn1ng, had had ff'lery intention of making peace' 
Uspring Rice reported that the Czar conteaaed that he was 
tricked into peace:;) Admiral Charle. S. Sper!'1 ot the United. 
States Na"y agreed. 'I haY. now in my tiles,' he said, fa let-
ter from our Na"al attache in ~okyo who name. the official in 
the Foreign Office who told hill the Japanese envoys had or4er, 
to make peace betore they left ~okyo. with or without either 
indemnity or territor;r.,lf.3 
tis last discussion of the relations of Theodore RooseYelt with Ge1'lll&D.1 
and France, and the account of the behind .. the-soenes uti"ity by Russia and 
Japan have not been inserted with a "iew to belittling Roosevelt's work at 
Port8JlOuth. In the following chapter his part will be ezamined more minutely. 
The abo"e facts have been included, without too much comment, to gi"e the com-
plete picture rather than for anr other reason. 
The title of this chapter, is. "'!'he Conterence and the Treaty"; but, in 
Chapter IV we will discuss at length. the actual treaty and the results and 
aigDit:Lcance of Roosevelt's work in securing the sucoessful outcOlile ot the 
Portsmouth Conterence. Suftice it to say here that the Treaty of Portsmouth, 
which was finally aigned on September 5, 1905. gave Japan substantially all 
that she had fought for and all that she oould justly expeot and ask for. 
42Ibid., note. 
43aeale, Roosevelt and thl !!!!" 308 note, "Admiral Charles S. Sperry to 
H. N. Allen," May 7, 1907, Allen Mss. 
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This was Dot at first apparent as can be 8een from some of the immediate re-
actions to the 'l'reat"t but time has show this to be true. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS. IMMEDIATE AND ULTIMATE, OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE TREATY 
The purpose of this final chapter is to continue the discussion of the 
Treaty which was the final fruit ot the Portsmouth Conterence. This will be 
done by a discussion ot the reception which the Treaty recei.ed. particularly 
in Japan and Russia. as well as by seeing other repercussions to the Treaty, 
and the Treaty's ettect on world politics and alignments. 
More closely connected with the purpose;ot the thesis will be the discus-
sion. after some mention of later results of the Portsmouth mediation, of the 
Bucce .. or failure ot Theodore Boosevelt's mediation, particularly as consicl-
ved in the light of his toreign poliCY, and the results of his peace confer-
enoe work. .An attempt will then be made to ascertain the significanoe of his 
Portsmouth work. 
If Japan's initial demands had surprised the American publio in particu-
!art the peace treaty itself was to hold even more of a surprise especially 
tor the Japanese people. Apparently the Japanese ao •• rnment had not prepared 
the Japanese nation for anything like what the final terms included. Whatever 
may ha •• been the Japanese Ga.ernment's initial stand on an indemnity. the 
tact is that, trom the tirat, the Japanese people had been sure that Japan 
would receive an indeami ty which would cover the expenses of the War. As has 
been aeen the indemnity was one ot the two big issues in the Portsmouth Con-
59 
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terence, and the Japanese people just did not understand that the situation at 
Portsmouth meant that the Japanese delegation there would have to compromise. 
The Japanese people had tought as a nation, as a single unit. and thel were 
quite aware that thel could not sta, in the tield much longer. While thel did 
not understand that the onlJ alternatiYe to no peace was war4 thel knew that 
thel could not stand much more war. the peace the delegates made was not made 
ftat an'1 price" but it was made at a just price, and that neces&ar7 price was 
the indemn1tl. But when no indemnitl was torthcoming, the Japanese public 
showed their displeasure with nolent anti-Amerioan dnoutratiou in the biS-
gar Japanese cities, 
Roosevelt could write to his daughter, Alice Lee Rooseyelte ttlt is enou 
to giye 8Jl1ODe a sense of sardonic 811U8ellent to see the wtq in which the peo-
ple general.l1, not onl7 in fI1 own count17 but elsewhere, puge the work purell 
bl the taot that it succeeded. It I had not brought a'bout peace I should have 
been laughed at and condemned. Now I am oyerpraised. ttl But he could alao 
write about the Japanese public's reaction to his triend, Beron Kaneko: "It 
seems to me that it would be well tor the Japanese to point out, or at least 
to lal .tress on, the enormous amount thel have won. As lOU know, I have tak-
en the same yiew ot the indemnitl business trom the beginning, and I think 
this is utterl, trivial compared to what Japan has secured. I think this 
ought to be pointed out public 17 • u2 
What was it that the Japanese had acquired or maintained through the '!'rea. 
lRoosevelt, Letters, V, 1, "Roosevelt to Alice Lee Roosevelt." Sept. 2, 
1905. 
2Ibid., 2, "Roosevelt to Kaneko," Sept. 2, 1905. 
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t71 In the words of Roosevelta 
The Japanese are now having trouble with their own people at home. 
and Griscom has just cabled us that there is heavy rioting in Tok-
IO ed a tendencl to attack all foreignerae ~ in the world the 
Japaneae atatesmen, usuall,. ao astute, permitted their people to 
think the,. had to get a large indemnity. I cannot understand. It 
the,. had in the beginning blown their trumpets over the immense 
uount the,. were getting. if the,. had shown how Korea was theira, 
Manchuria in etfect theirs, Port Arthur and Dalny theirs; how the,. 
have won a tl'iwaph which since the daJs of Napoleon has only been 
paralleled by aerm&n1 in 18?O--if they had done all this I think 
thel could have made their people feel proud instead of humiliated.' 
But the Japanese people really forgot or never considered the cession of all 
Liaotung PeD1naula and all the rights on the Southern Manchurian Railw81 as e 
indesn1ty, aa norinsq well points out." ~incy Howe summarizes the situa-
tion: 
'l'he rulers of Japan, however, had their people under control 
and knew that the,. had not done too badly. They had their al11-
ece with England and their agreement with the United States. 
tney had gained their first subatantial foothold on the Asiatic 
mainland. They had defeated a aajor EUropean power and had there-
bl sained a unique preatige among some Asiatic peoples and had 
fired othera with aimilar nationaliatic ambitions. Thel bad won 
precious experien~3. too--difficult to lIleuure, perhaps, but dif-
ficult also to underestimate. What the,. had lost was best ex-
pressed by a Japanese diplomat in London who told one of his Brit-
ish colleaguos: 'We oed to be a nation ot artistsl our art waa 
realll very good. You called us barbarians then. Now our art is 
not so good as it waa, but we baTe learned to kill, and lOU call 
us civilized." 
If there was a reaction in Japan to President Roosevelt and the United 
States, there was also a reaction to the Japanese Government and the Japanese 
'Ibid., 15, "Roos.,.elt to Von Sternberg," Sept. 6, 1905. 
4,u,ohael T. norinsky. Russia, ! Riston !!9. .e Interpretation, (New 
York, 1953), II, 1278. 
'Quincl Howe, ! World Histoa 2! .2!!!: 2e Times, (New York, 1949), 232-
nation in our country. 'lb.ere vere as JDan1 authorities as there vere views 
wi th regard to American public opinion and the Port8llOuth Conference. As has 
been seen, Witte waa intent on changing America's view of Russia and turning 
it cOIIpletely pro-Russian, whereas it had previousl,. been quite pro-Japanese. 
Witte believed that he had not only turned Roosevelt trOll his pro-Japane.e at-
ti tude, but that he had also turned the whole American public to Russia' s 
aide. Some authors, in vriting about the Portsmouth Conference. agree with 
Witte. As for Roosevelt, he 881S that he never changed his regard for Japan: 
"I was pro-Japanes8 before, but atter fIJ experience with the peace commission-
ers I am far stronger pro-Japane.e than ever,n6 
All regaria the supposed reversal in public opinion, tvo exhaustive stud-
ies of the Portsmouth Treat1 and Conference answer wholl,. in the negative--
there was no great reversal; there vas no significant revereal at all.1 
According to Thorson: I1The Results SWIDIariZed in this paper derive frOll 
an intensive anal1sis for the period of the Portsmouth Conference of the edi-
torial poliCies of sOlIe fift,. representative newspapers from e.l.1-. sectiona of 
the United States and of all the major periodicals of the day. !his makes 
clear that there vas no shift of American public opinion of the kind or de-
gree claimed. nS And Tupper and McRe1Dolds aummarize the situation: 
6Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt S!! lh! Ri,e, 310, "Ioosevelt to W. W. Rock-
hill," Aug. 20, 1905. 
1Cf. Eleanor Tupper and George MoRe1l101ds, Japan y! Aalencan Publio Q:R!a-
!Sa, New York, 19311 W. B. Thorson, tfAmerican Public Opinion and the Ports-
aouth Peace Conference," l!!!. Americs Historical Review, LIII (April, 1948), 
439-464. 
8Thorson. American P\1bUc Qein1on. 444. 
II:' 
The Toreaty of Porteaouth of 190' does mark a turn in the tide 
of American sentiment toward Japan, but the turn was not as notice-
able aa we have been led to believe. Rather than a reversal in at-
titude at this time, it was a lessening of our exaltation in Japa-
nese progress with a tremor of skepticism in the expression of 
.American approval. We still were enthusiasti,c for Japan, but not 
to 80 high a degree. It was financiers, merchants, and those who 
were especially interested in seeing Manchuria returned to China 
without reservations who opposed Japan through their influence on 
terms of the treaty. But it would be a mistake to believe that 
public opinion had suddenly' jumped from Japanophilism to Japano-
phobia.':I~ 
If there were somewhat vocal reactions in the United States and Japan, 
Russia's immediate reaction was the very opposite. 
The Russian masses greeted the news of peace with character-
istic stolidity, and pr88U11ably with a feeling of relief not de-
void of gratitude to America. The liberals and radicals were not 
completely happy, man, of them were hoping that continued defeat 
would lead to a full-blown revolution. Members of the war faction 
vere deeply angered by Roosevelt's intervention. They still be-
lieved that the, needed only one more campaign to turn the tide of 
defeat and redeem their tarnished honor. Petiticms urging contin-
uanoe of the con£aict poured in 0. the government. some of them 
from the cler81_ 
To the mass of Russian people the War had been fought in far-off places 
for a cause that meant nothing to them. They would rather have peace than war 
but even the terms of that peace did not particularly interest them. Nicho-
las's reaction was somewhat more vocal in that, as has been seen. he did not 
want the war to end as it did. Be was never convinced that a conference table 
oould turn a military de teat into a diplomatic victory. The Czar's response 
to Witte was hostile and cool. He cabled him on August 30' "Do not sign the 
conditions ot peace until amount for keep of war prisoners is fixed and rati-
9rupper & McReynolds, Japan !!1 American Opinion, 17. 
lOrhomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia. (Ithaca, N. I., 1950), 203. 
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fied by me after ;you have notified it. Nikolai. ull When Witte came horae he 
was automatically made a count. but in the end exile and punishment were to be 
his reward. As for the rest of Russia the Czar was sitting on dynamite and he 
knew it. In January 1905 Russian soldiers had slain five hundred Russians who 
were agitating for reform. fhis forced the Czar to make some concessions on 
paper, but things went from bad to worse as is seen in the failure of the Duma i 
in its seasions which tiDally ended in dissolution. The revolutionaries al-
WB7s wanted more and the Czar never reall;r gave Bn;rthing. 
Between September and Ma1 the Government was graduall;r acquiring 
control of the situation and was able to adopt increasingly re-
pressive measures. The last two IIIOl'1tha of 1905 were character-
ized b;y atrocious persecutions and blood;Y executions, especiall;y 
among the Siberian exiles. Upon Witte's return from Portsmouth 
he was placed at the head of the Government and succeeded at the 
olose of the Algeciras Conference in securing a loan in Paris 
and London. Thus strengthened financiall;r and no longer entan-
gled in the Far East, the Rusaian Government felt strong enough 
to disaolye the Duma by imperial decree July 21, 1906. So far 
as immediate success was CODcerned the reform movement had been 
a failure. Beginning as a moderate reform led by patriotic mem-
bers of the professional and relativel1 privileged classes it 
had passed by rapid stages into a more and more revolutioDarJ 
movement in which economic p1.l1'Poses ~reasingly threatened to 
overshadow merel1 political measures. 
lbe real revolution was yet to C()ftl!h 1,lhe Revolution of 1905 passed qui-
etl;y enough, but this was not the onl;r occurrence in Russia connected with the 
recent war. Russian Far Eastern foreign policy underwent a change as a result 
of the war and the Conference. Russia could no longer expand in the Far East; 
as will be noted, the idea of Russia f~cing Japan turned out to be an illusion 
Japan was supreme while Russia had to turn e;yes towards the Ba.lkans and the 
~oted in Dillon. Es:y.P!'. 310-311. 
l.2»ennett, Roosevelt. 290. 
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N.ar East where Russia began to crowd her rec.nt ally. Gel'll8J11'. 
It iuuia could no longer expand into the Far r.ut such was not the case 
tor Japan. Mention baa been made of some American r.actions to the Japane ••• 
but this was further increased by the immigration problem in California and on 
the Pacific coast in general. 1'his waa not a new problem by any m.ans. The 
Japanese bad hoped in the laat days of the ninet .. nth century to be able to 
.xpand and s.ttle .ome of the exc •• s population in the United State.i but the 
sudden influx of ch.ap Japan.s. labor.r. into the Am.rican mark.t around the 
turn of the c.ntury aroused AII.rican commercial and labor int.r.sts. In 1900 
Japan bad 'f'oluntarily agre.d to limit h.r ~gration, particularly of un-
akilled labor, into this country. !his quieted both sid.s for the n.xt few 
rears, and attention was IlUtually drawn to the Russo-Japan •• e conflict and 
awq from the immigration probl.... But near the close of the War in r.bru&r1 
1905 SOlIe Calitornia papers start.d the anti-Japan •• e aci tatioD by app.aling 
to the Chine.. Exclusion Law of 1882 which had graduallr been strengthened 
since its initial passage. 1'h.,. held that this fed.ral law al.eo applied to 
the Japan.... and the Calitornia Stat. Legislature bolstered this agi tatioD 
by pase1Dg an anti-Japane.e r.solution demanding that the Fed.ral Goyernment 
act against further Japanese immigration. Next pressure was .x.rted to .xp.l 
the Japanese from the public schools, particularly in San Francisco, the cen-
t.r of the agitation. Segregation was deJl8J1ded against the "Yellow Peril", 
and the climax of the ag1 tation was r.ached in 1906 att.r the great .arth-
quake. Thi. disaster out down ayailable school space and in October the 
I 
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schools were ordered to send all Orientals to a special SChool.l3 Simultane-
ously in California, legislation was introduced against the Japanese but it 
was dropped largely due to the pressure of the president.. At this till. Rooae-
Yelt sent a tederal investigator to study the as1tuation, but before anything 
positive could be done the Japanese GoYernaent quite rightly expressed her ex-
tree displeasure oyer Amerle .. disorill1natory lIOyes. 
~e president was just as anxious as the Japanese to settle the whole at-
fair. RooseYelt's words to Henry Cabot Loclge during the earl, stages ot the 
agitaUOl'l show how he was invoking, when and where po881.ble, his dual polic,. 
ot soft words with a strong arm behind the W~I 
I am utterly disgusted at the manifestations which have begun to 
appear on the Paoific slope in favor of excluding the Japane.e 
exactly as the Chine.e are excluded. The California State Legis-
lature and various other bodies have acted in the wor.t possible 
taste and in the most otfensive manner to Japan. Yet the Sena-
tors and COIlgressmen from the.e yery states were lukewarm about 
the nay,- last ,ear, It give. lie a feeling of contempt and dis-
gust to see them challenge Japanese ho.tilit,. and ju.tif, b,. 
their actions aD1 feeling the Japanese II1ght have aga.1.nst us, 
while at the SUle time refusing to take steps to defend tha-
selves against the formidable foe whOlD the,. are read7 with 811ch 
careleu insolence to antagonize. How people can act in this 
W81 with the RuS8~apane.e war going on betore their e,.es I Ca&-
not understand. I do all I cft to counteract the effects, but I 
cannot accomplish ever,rthing. 
The Federal Government oftered two more or less i.ediat. solutions: the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement'· of 1907 and Roosevelt's sending the United States nee 
around the world, 1907-9. 
Under the Gentlemen's Agreement negotiated in February 1907. the Japanese 
!3tupper & McRe,-nolds, Japy l!! Americy Opinion. 2'+. 
l'+Ro08evelt. Letters, IV, 1180-1181. If Roosevelt to Lodge," May 15. 1905. 
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Govel'llllent promised to keep. cloaer watch on the puaporta iaeued to pr0spec-
tive 1m1granta to the United States; 1t also promised "not to iuue pasaporta 
to laborer., IJk1l1ed or unakilled, except to thoae who bave been dClll1c11ed 1D 
the Ua1te4 Stat .. , or to famiUes of nch peraona. nl.5 'lbe.e were the _jor 
po1ata of the Agreement, and it was bo18tered bJ conaequct federal lava, 
vb1ch rema1ne4 in aD UIleaq state of effecUvea ... until 1924.16 The federal 
pJ"O"l180 to a .. eral i_gration bill read as follovel 
That wheaeYeJ' the Pru:l.dent shall De .Usfied that puaporta is-
sued b1 ~ foreign govel"DlleAt to its citizens to go to IU11 COUll-
trJ other tbaa the United States, or to U1iDaul.aF poaMU1on of 
the United States or to the Canal. Zone, are being used for the 
puI'pOH of eaabling the holder to COM to the continental. tem.-
tol'1 of the United State. to the detriment of labor eond! tiona 
therein, the Prea1dct .,. retuM to permit such citia .. of the 
count17 iasuing such paasporte to enter the continental territol7 
of the United States t'J'OfI such othel' COUDtrJ or :troll such inaulal" 
poaseasions or ('rom the Canal 1.one.17 
In the Ught of this Japanese-I!merican a8ftement Cal!tomia promised to re-
adjust the achool situatlon.18 
It is 'beyond the scope of this present study to go much farther afield in 
these Japanese-American affaire. Incidents contil'lued to occur, but, a calm 
though UD8aSJ peace wu maintained, poae1bl1 because neither aid.e wanted to 
show ita lull hand and start any wide Beale trouble. 
15Gri.avold, !it Eettem fo1tQl S?! y.!_, 359 note; from ttMorris to Acting 
Sec. of State, tf Jan. 25. 1921, beD iflfYM S !Ia!. l'9£eip RtHU2H illY. 
u,S,. J.2gl, Washington, 1936, II, 329. 
l.6.DU., 360 
l1Quoted in Tupper & McRe)'Dolda, JaRS! !!. American 2J9.BiOP, 30-31, from 
~O!!!l ~, '9th CoDgre88, 2nd Session, XLI, Washington, 1907, 2809 
part, aU ~:Part 4). 
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Partly to insure the United States against any such danger Roosevelt took 
the second measure towards smoothing over Japanese-American relations. fbro 
the years i.ediately following the Russo-Japuese conflict there were constan 
war scares. Besides initiating the fortification of the Philippines and other 
American possessions in the Pacific. Roosevelt at last revealed his plan for 
sending the whole United States fleet around the world, particularly into the 
Pacific Ocean and past Japan. Though there were many motives for his action, 
the most obvious to many was his wish to overawe Japan with a show of American 
MYU power. He alao saw the tactical advantages for the DaYy i teelf in such 
a yoyage. !his display was intimately tied ~p with another pet project of 
Rooseyelt's. the Panama Canal. He hoped that pressure would be forthcoming to 
tinish the Canal. when it vas seen that the neat would haYe to travel all the 
way around South America in order to reach the Pacific. Also pressure would 
be exerted tor a larger navy. another Roosevelt hope and dream. 
Roos .. elt thought it was best to send the fleet in peace. and he belit-
tled any cries of danger in leaving the Atlantic coast unguarded. As to the 
problem ot money for sending the neet around the world, Rooseyel t lIere17 said 
that he had enough appropriated funds to send the fleet halt-~ and then the 
fleet could sta1 there if Congress would not raise money for the return jour-
ney.19 
Whether Roosevelt's move in sending the neet around the world was wise 
or not is still disputed. No untoward incidents happened and Japan greeted 
the fleet with sincere respect and courte..,_ At the same time. however. Ja-
19:Bishop. 1'he04ore Roosevelt, II, 66. 
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paD vas concluding her entente with Rusaia--an agreement Roosevelt thought 
never should or would come about. Whether Roosevelt's action fired the rising 
Japanese milital7 class to military and induatrial rivalries is not known, but 
this nt vas gradually dominant on the Japanese acene atter this period. Be 
that as it may, Roosevelt vu well pleased with his action and its immediate 
results seemed good enough. 
FUrther attempts at a Japanese-American rapproc~ent were taken in 1908 
wi th the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30. Supposed17 this agreement 
was to pre.erve the Open Door in China. and Manchuria; it was to keep the "st&-
tu quo." AlIIoat without realizing it the Roosevelt "ministration had negat-
ed its work at Portaaouth. By this time Japan had made very deep inroads into 
Manchuria and had begun to exclude all foreigners-the very thing Roosevelt 
bad tried to avoid by maintaining the balance of power in the Far East. 
More reparoussiOllS will be .tudied later. For completeneaa' Sake, it can 
be mentioned that all through this period Roosevelt had to handle a similar 
situation with resard to the Chineae who finally boycotted American goods. 
Alread7 aome of the reactions to the Portsmouth Treaty and thus to the 
mediator, President Roosevelt, have been discussed, namely the reactions of 
the two belligerents Russia and Japan. Now it will be well to consider reac-
tions and commendations or condemnations of Roosevelt from other people and 
other sources. This is not the place to give an estimate of Roosevelt, but 
only to record what. others thought or at least said to him and about him. 
Of course there were the usual and expected congratulatory notes from the 
rulers of Japan and Russia, and the other interested powers sent the usual 
letters of congratulation and praise. Roosevelt, as was to be expected, took 
I. 
thes ... uagea in .tride and realized that fINch ot the adulation was akin deep. 
Be Vl"Ote on Auswst 31, 1905 to Douglae Robinson: 
'l'hat wu an awtully nice letter of yours, old tellow, and I 
deeply thank you tor it. But don't you be misled by the fact 
that just at the moment I.HD are 8pukhlg well of me. The;r will 
.peak ill soon enough. As Hr. Loeb remarked to me toc.iq, s0me-
time soon I 8hall haye to 8pank 801M 11 ttle brigand of a South 
.American repubUc. and then all the well-meaning idiots will turn 
and shriek that this io inconsistent with what I c.U.d with the 
peace o~Oerence, where .. it viU be exaou,. in Une with it, in 
reality. 
Beside. the crowned heads ot etatea and their statesmen, othera wrote to 
Boo .. velt about his work at Portsmouth. Joeeph Ebcklia B1ahop, Roosevelt's 
cloae triend and early' biographer, WJ'Ote ot the Prea1dent' s herculean ettort. 
and attempts at pI'Ocurina l'lu'opean aid.21 :r.n one plaoe this "oanonizer" ot 
Roos .... elt writes: ttlt rIJI.l1 be said with truth that he Wll8 hi_elf the Conter-
eDoe. for he was it. guiding and controlling foroe. Ita final agsoeement was 
the one vh1ch at the outset he had told both the envole and their governments 
that thel should make. • •• B7 persuading those governments to accept his 
views, he von auco_ in the end, tor it vas under direct instructions froI!J 
Tokio l!tQl and St. Petersburg that the envoys came together. 1hat this is aD 
accurate .tatement ot the case ia olearly revealed by the President's meaaagea 
and letters at the time.'.z2 
Both Serp Witte and Baron Roman Roaen were grandiloquent in their prai.e 
ot the President. Further teat1.alonJ to the PrMident'. achievement vu had 111 
2Oaoo ... elt, ltttm. IV, lJ28, uBoos"elt to Rob1uon, tt Aug. '1, 1905. 
ZlB1ahop, 'llwodoa Rootevelt, I. 37'. 
22llz!.t. t 405-406. 
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his receiving the Kobel Beace Prize which included a check tor almost $37,000. 
With the mone,. he started a toundation tor promoting the cause ot industrial 
peace. Though not much came ot this toundation, the money was put to good 
purposes during the First WOrld War tor war relief. 
However, not all were pro-Roosevelt, while Dl8J11 were in the praise ot the 
President, and right17 so, there were those who thought that Rooaevelt's inte 
vention was not onlJ wrong but that it was a colloaal tailure. ot course, it 
i. alV8.18 8all7 to find .s l22!i tactg critics and aeere, but this doe. not mean 
that there were Done to cri tici.e at the time ot the Port_outh Coaterence. 
Some thought that Roosevelt was alair in prpcuriJlg peace, that he was cheat-
ing ODe or the other ot the belligerenta.23 
And while Roosevelt was being cODgratulated or condemned, the rest ot the 
diplomatic world was Dot aitting b,. weaviDg oUve-branch crowns tor the hero 
ot Port8llOuth. Chancellori.s were bu.,. figuring out what Port8ll0uth meant tor 
them. 80me ot the new al1gJl11ents were .xpected and others were surpria.s. 
Dow .. er, what Roos ..... lt did at Port8llOuth, about which more will be said lat.r 
had Dot.worthy repercussions OD the so-called balaDce ot power • 
.As France aaw Russia going down in the Far East she realized that Ruaaia 
would ne.er be able to give her substantial aid in the V.st or the N.ar Eut, 
but as she n.eded an ally she tUrDed to England whom she joiDed iD the Entente 
Cordiale iD April 1904, during the War. 1'b.ia oould be called the beginning ot 
franco-British good relations. France also tUrDed to placate GermanI. her 
Dext door neighbor as a poteDtial good frieDd or a formidable en8lll1. 
Z"ale, Roose •• lt and 1!l! &!!. 311-312. 
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Mention has already been made of Germany and Russia's renewal, as it 
"ere, of their good relations through the .eeting at Bjorko on July 24, 1905. 
Gel"llan1 and bsaia were friends t though the Kaiser was pl.a,y1ng the Ozar tor 
the fool more than the latter realized. The Kaiser played a clever, cat-and-
!lOuse lame by appeasing the Ozar and then by getting him more than ever en-
twined in the Far East. While the Kaiser was sincere enough in soliCiting the 
friendship of the Czar, still he was perfectly pleased to see the Ozar tied 
down to a long and hard war far from western &!rope. I t was only when the rev-
olutionar;y spirit in Russia threatened to spread to Germany that the 1Caiser 
quicklJ and wholeheartedl7 worked to ,et the ,Czar to atop his war with the Jap-
ane... And, after the Rusao-Japanese War, Bua8ia turned frOil the Far East to 
become a cause of great anxiety to GeI'lllaDY when the Russian foreisn policy mak-
ers dire.ted their etforts to the We.t. To the dismay of Gel'BUlD7. Ruasia and 
EDg1aad entered into an alliance in August 1907. 
But the ... ery thing which Roosevelt had worked against at Portsmouth hap-
pened in 1907 when Russia and Japan joined in signing three treaties. Witte, 
at a low point in th. Conference, had suggested such a move and had a.en ita 
neceasity.24 Russia and Japan signed further treaties ot alliance and mutual 
support in 19~O and 1912. Thus one ot Rooaevel t t a ma.jor reasons for taking 
part in the Portsmouth Conference was done away with. 
Another notable change occurred when former enemies, France and Japan, be-
came allies and entered into a pact in June 1907. By all of these alliances 
and counter-alllances Great Britain, Russia, France, and Japan.-the _jor con-
24 6 Witte, Memoirs, 17 • 
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te.tut. in the recent conflict.-were united. It vaa almoat a cOilplete dip-
10ilatic revereal from pre-war days. The balance of power which Boosevelt had 
tought to leeep was a ayth. Japan bad superaeded Rusa:La as the dominant power 
in the Far East; th~ vere not tacing each other as the mediator bad planned. 
In tact, the two tormer enemies vere not on!)' not tacing one another, the), 
were together in tacing eve1"7bo41 in the Far East. Bertrud Russell somewhat 
glum!)' sums up the situation in the.e wordsc 
Japan'. rise to supreMe)' in the Far East put an end to the 
ambi tiona of European Powers in China, and thus removed trom the 
sphere of their ntual barpining the last iaportant region that 
the), bad lett unappropriated. Benceforth, the planet was mapped 
out, ud a sain to one State could onlf. be secured at the expense 
of some other. This intensified rivalries, and made adjustments 
more difficult; the expansive torces which had found their outlet 
in imperialiam were compelled to operate, no longer in distant un-
developed regions, but nearer hOlle, and in direct competition v:Lth 
neighboring nations. Though state_en toresaw the result, the,. 
lacked the v:Lll and the intelligence to prevent ~~; iJlpotently, 
though not blindly. the,. drifted to oatastrophe. 
Was Rus.ell prophesying that catastrophe of catastrophe., Pearl Harbor? 
Be that as it may, IIIUJ1' point to Portsmouth as the beginning ot Japanese-Amer-
ican rivalry and hostility, which ended in the sudden attack, one v.r,. similar 
to that on Port Arthur, on Pearl Barbor in 1941., Though Roosevelt remained as 
pro-Japanese as ever, he did give way to the repeated war scares that were 
aired in the years tollov:Lng the Russo-J"apanese War. He ordered, as already 
DOted, further fortifications for United States poaaessions in the Pacific. 
In Ju17 1907 he confided to Root, his Secretary ot State, that: "In France, 
England and Germany the best information is that we shall bave war with Japan 
Z"rtrand Russell, Freedom ver!!! Org!!lizatiQn, 1814-1914, (New York, 
1934>, "2". 
I' 
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and that ve shall be beaten •• ,26 Though the thU. ted States readily acknowledged 
the -'!.U aocO!!!pl1 in Japan's position in Korea and Manchuria, the United State 
did not expect Japan to isolate Manchuria a8 she ettectively did in November 
1905 or to take over Korea as she did through the protocol with Korea of No-
.ember 17. 1905. Howe ... 8r, the Tatt-Katsura Agreement of the pre ... ious Jul1 had 
all but .tamped the United Statea' signature to the Korean transter. 
A lull came in Japanese-American hoatill t,. b1 the .igning of the Japa-
nese-Merican Arbitration Treat,. in May 1908. In time, hove ... er, men such as 
Secretary ot State Knox would take o.er and they would reverse the pollcies of 
the Roose ... elt administration. '!'he gradual d~teat of Roosevelt's Portamouth 
plana caused just u much by new tace. and ide .. at hOile as by the _chiu.-
tiona of the foreign office. throu.ghout the world, will be diSCU88ed in the 
tor the disintegration of Roo-
..... eltian hope. and policies wl11 be ad ... lIDced. 
As waa said ill the beginninl ot thi. chapter. more clo.el,. connected with 
the purpoee of this thesis will be the discussion of the aueeeas or tailure of 
Roose ... elt as the mediator ot the Portsmouth Conterence. !his estimate will be 
attempted b1 considering the President's work at Portamouth and his toreign 
polic,. eontraated with their result. after the Conference and the signing of 
the !reaty. Atter this attempt at an estimate ot Roosevelt at Portsmouth a 
further judgment will be ... entured concerning the significance ot his work 
there. 
PrenoU8 attempt., expert and alllateur. to evaluate Roosevelt and hi. 
2~seveltt Letters. V, 725. "Roosevelt to Root," July 23, 1907. 
Portsmouth work ha ... e been as ... aried as the p.ople making them, though. they 
ha .... fallen roughly into two classea and periods. As Howard K. Beale points 
out: 
While he was ali ... e and during the years following his death, 
literature on Roosevelt tended to reflect the popular admira-
tion of his contemporaries for his handling of international 
problems. Then the tide turned and a series of studies ap-
peared that questioned both his wisdom and his ability as an 
international statesman. His importance in .... ents in which 
he unquestionably participated was denied. His ... eracity in 
telling of other events and his part in them was questioned. 
It seemed now time to ask whether the early admiration or the 
later depreci~11on or perhaps a third more balanced view was 
the soundest. 
Boward Beale goes on to give his judgment of Roosevelt, his "third more 
'balanced view." Beale admits that ultimately. if not almost immediately, Roo-
se ... elt's plans at Portsmouth failed. The reasons which Beale adduces to sup-
port his statement are I the growth of Chinese nationalism; the Rwsso-Japanese 
pacts of 1907 and the following years; the post-Portsmouth Japanes. exclusion 
policy again.t foreigners, particularly Americans, in such Japanese holdings 
as in Manchuria; the sudd.n rev.real of Roo ...... lt·. policies by hi. succ.s-
sors, the growth and strength of the military faction in Japan; and. Roo .... 
... elt's lack of understanding of China and Chin •• e nationaliam.28 Beale alao 
discu.... why Roose ... el t' s major aim 1n preserving the open door and reinsuring 
the balance of power was not realized. He 8UlI8 up part of his estimate of Ro 
s .... elt and his contemporary imperialistically-minded advi.ers by eayinga 
"They had not forecast the total nature of modern war. They 
27Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise, 1x. 
---
28Ibid •• 332-334. 
had placed faith in a balance of power that could never be kept 
in balance. They had not divined that seeking safety through 
being more powerfully armed than rivals would only stimulate an 
armaments race in which no nation ever kept far enough ahead of 
its opponents to feel secure. They had refused to take serioue-
ly other methods than armed force in establishing international 
stability. In underestimating the destructiveness of modern war, 
they had overlooked the grim necessity of finding methods of or-
::::~~~ the world's will to peace so that there would be no 
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But, as Beale admits, Roosevelt and his advisers could not have foreseen all 
of these eventualities, and at the time they acted as best they could with 
their knowledge of the circumstances. They were in power and they used their 
power as they saw fit. 
Another expert on foreign policy, Samuel nagg Bemis, dryly writes that 
"President Roosevelt received the Nobel peace prize and the plaudits of the 
world for his conspicuous diplomacy, but because it did some harm and no good 
to the United States; therefore it was another blunder, the third blunder of 
American policy in the Far East. ,,30 (Bemis considered the acquisition of the 
Philippines, the Open Door policy, and the Knox proposals to neutralize China, 
the other great blunders of American foreign policy in the Far East.) 
SoIIewhat more kindly, and fairly, Thomas A. Bailey judges Roosevelt's 
difficult position as peacemaker' "Was Roosevelt's mediation a serious 1118-
take, as sOlIe have charged? Would not Japan have collapsed if he had not 
stepped in? And would not a dominant Russia have been a better guardian of 
the Open Door than Japan has since then been? These questions cannot, of 
29D!!.., 458-459-
30Samuel F. Bemis, ! Diplomatic Histoq 2! !!!! United States, 2nd ed., 
(New York, 1947), 494. 
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cour •• , b. answered with tinality. But as on. viewed the problem in the year 
1905. there was DlUch to be said tor the balance ot power idea. It'l 
Of course, others, as Bishop and Dennett, reveal a thoroughly pro-Roose-
v.lt trame ot mind. As waa said betore, an attempt will b. made to come to an 
estimate ot Roosevelt at Portsmouth and hi. policr as he worked it out there, 
as judged by the results ot the Conterence and the Treaty. 
And unfortunately, a point otten paaaed over is the actual obtaining ot 
the meeting and the peace at Portsmouth. Was not this act an achievement ot 
note? 'l'he obvious answer is: 1es. It can be said without exaggeration that 
Roosevelt did initiate the negotiations; that he did work with great tact and 
ald.ll through the prelimi1uar7 negotiation. preparatory to the Conterence; that 
he did open the actual Conterence with the greatest tinease; that he did in-
tervene at the crucial moment ot the Conterence and work to bring peace; and, 
that his was the co.promise ult1aatel1 agreed upon tor the resolution ot the 
Conterence stalemate. A mere catalogue ot his ettorts as shown in his corre-
apoadence 'fro. the 21st to the 28th of August shows that he was really work-
iag for peace. As tar as the delegate. were concerned it was Roosevelt who 
maneuvered attairs towards peaoe. It was Roosevelt's compromise, independent 
of &n1 other. that was the salvation ot the Conterence. Again, Roosevelt was 
the one, to a large degree, who aotually did achieve peace at Portsmouth. 
This is not to S&7, however, that Roosevelt charged in as the wholl,. 
.elfless peacemaker. It the Japanese tooled the public by their seeming al-
truism in tighting the war, Roosevelt was never secretive about his motives as 
~0IIa. A. Bailey t !:. Diplomatic HistoD' 2! .!h! Ametlcan Puple, 'rd ed. t 
(New York, 1947). 567. 
78 
peacemaker. Dennett notwithatanding,32 Roosevelt expressed his purpose in be-
coming the peacemaker to Senator Hale in 1906: 
While my main motive in stri'ring to bring about peace between 
Japan and Russia vas the disinterested one of putting an end 
to the bloodshed, I vas also intluenced by the desirability of 
preventing Japan trom driving Russia completely out ot East 
Asia. This object vas aChieved, and Ruesia stands tace to tace 
with Japan in Manchuria. But the internal condition ot Russia 
is nov such that she is no longer in arq "'8.'1 a menace to or re-
straint upon Japan, and probably will not be tor a number ot 
years to come. • •• It seems to me that all of this necessi-
tates our having a defini te policy with regard to her; a policy 
ot behaving with absolute good fa! th, courtesy and justice to 
her on the one hand, and on the other, ot keeping our navy in 
such sha~ as to lllake ita risky thing tor Japan to go into war 
with us.3} 
Other positive gains achieved by RooseY~lt in the Portsmouth Conterence 
are upholding the diplomatic reputation ot the United States, as vell as his 
own reputation. Roosevelt's determination was one of the major ingredients in 
the latter days ot the peace talks. Be wanted peace, pure and simple; but, he 
also wanted to keep the United Statea t reputation as an important and a world-
minded nation betore the powers. What part his personal desire played is the 
part &n10ne's pride would play with perhaps a little more because ot the type 
ot person that Roosevelt vas. Another positive note in Roosevelt's Portsmouth 
work i. that, had he failed, even if the War had continued, eventually some 
sort of concert ot European powers vould haYe stepped in. The obviou$ result 
32])ennett, Roosevelt, 4. nHe vas not tempted to sacrifice the interests 
ot either Asia or Europe to the political or economic advantage of the United 
States. From the Peace ot Portsmouth hi. country derived no material advan-
tage of arq sort. Indeed, we shall be led to observe the singular absence 
from Roosevelt's policy ot any great concern for the commercial interests of 
the United Statea." 
"Roosevelt, Letters, V, 474, "Roosevelt to Hale," Oct. 2.7. 1906. 
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of such action would have been the division and partition of China and Chinese 
utionali8ll might haTe taken decades to build up again, whereas, unknowingly 
eo far as RooseTelt vas concerned, Obine.e nationalism was given half a chance 
by the Portsmouth Treaty. 
But when we consider RooseTelt's foreign policy as he applied it at Ports-
mouth we run into a somewhat more negative picture. His old policy was one of 
soft words and a strong arm; and, as applied to the Far East, this included 
the JlUlintenance of the Open Door and the intesrit,. of Chiaa as well as that of 
Manchuria. 
Taldag each of the.e pointa, the pointe at i88ue in the Far East, we can 
see that RooseTelt did not procure a single one of them. 'rhe Open Door, par-
ticularly in Manchuria, was slammed shut almost before the ink on the Ports-
mouth Treat,. was dr;y. If it had not been tor the sudden upaur,e of Chineee 
natiouli .. China would have become the European pla;yground of the East. As 
it turned out Boosevelt's misguided polic,. toward China vas to anger the Chi-
nese to the point of establishing a boycott &pinst United States goods. It 
do.s seem strange that just what Roosevelt was fighting for 80 energ.ticall,. 
vas precisely vhat he did not obtain. 
His vork at Portsmouth and his foreign polic,. as judged by the results 
appear definitely a failure. If this is 80 and the facts 8&1 that it is-was 
BooseTelt a success or a failure as mediator? Granted that he obtained the 
peace, a peace is supposed to be something permanent, permanent to a degree 
uyvay, and this peace would not turn out to be Yer,. permanent. SolIe of the 
reasons for his failure such as the growth of Chinese nationalism, the Ru.so-
Japanese alliances, Japanese exclusionia in Manchuria, the reTereal of many 
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ot BooseTelt's policies by his successors, the growth ot the adllt817 faction 
in Japan, RooseTelt's misconception ot Chinese nationalism, and so on, haTe 
alrea~ been discussed. But most at these deTelopments were largely unfore-
seeable b,. Roosevelt in Jul,. and August 1905. 
Admittedly Roosnelt clearl,. misunderstood China. His tirst and ob'Yious 
adstake in her regard was not eyen proTiding tor her at the conference table. 
atter all, he was fighting tor her integrity and rights. Part ot his attitude 
toward China, one of neglect, was due to his Daaic attitude to all nations 
whom he considered to be "backward." In part RooseTel t was mOTed to this at-
titudet because ot his troubles over Chine.~ emigration to America. FUrther, 
Ioos..,.elt was all tor the maintenance ot China, but this meut the old order, 
and thus he just could not .ee bow the new nationallSID in China oould work tor 
the good ot the count1"1. RooseTelt wanted the Manchu Dynasty to do what it no 
longer was able to do. Roosevelt completel,. "miased the boat" here but he 
could have clone nothing elae t given his background and trame ot mind. 
As tor Roos..,.elt and the Open Door, he saw b,. 1910. at leut, that, on 
paper, the Open Door vas a nice policy; but. that when force on our part was 
neceS8aZ01 tor some non-rita! interest the Open Door had to go by the board. 
!hus hi. stand on the Open Door changed over the ,.ears and, it not too real-
istic at tiret, soon enough became so.'4 Similarl,. the balance of power i. a 
nioe thing on paper but its implementation was quite another matter. And the 
turther changes in alliance. could hardly haTe been tores.en as nations usual-
11 do not adTertise their secret alliance. or their hidden motives tor enter-
Y+:aoo.e.elt, Letters, VII, 190, "Roosevelt to Tatt," Dec. 22, 1910. 
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ina suoh pacta. 
Baa10all1 Boosevelt's dual polic, itaelf led to trouble. He wanted nice 
worcla which are good but not always eo effeotive, 8Ild 8trona IU'IIS which, of 
courae, are an everpreaent element of modem diplomacy. The concept of the 
world aa It comparatively auU unit was developing, and 80 was the concept anel 
the crut11 reallty of slobal war. But, atter all, Roosevelt's polic, vaa not 
unique with him, tor it 18, bu1call1', the polio, 01" practice of all oOWltne. 
in the ahr1Dld.ag world of tod81. For the United atat .. of tbat cIaJ it was new 
and Boo.evelt waa preaenting it to the ution and the wOI"ld. 
OII.e IIIq .peculate 011. the ''a1ght-h/lve-beeu'' of h1atol7, but that i. not 
on Civilization, 011. dete.e. aad, given the poait1on that he waa iD, the high-
.. t iD h1a land, the queat10n ot hi. auoc... 01' failure laJ"ge~ lie. 1D hi. 
woen t7 01' lack of it 111. hi. part 111. the Portsmouth eontereaoe. Bere 18 one 
place, in particular, where ltooaeYelt rauat be taken, to a gnat delP'". on hi. 
word. Be ea1d that he wanted peace and he gave b1a l'euona for wutiac it. 
He .. bone.t 1D ,... .. lJ.n& all of hi. motive.. ae tol"lll\ll&t.d hi. polio, w1th 
the.e motive. in IliAd and cl1rectecl hi. work at Portsmouth accordil'1l to hi. 
pollC1 and hi. motive.. 1be personal element 1A RooaeYelt·. soU" .. and poll-
01 pl.qe4 a large part, particular17 larse as the ... was 'rb.eodore Rooaevelt. 
"The trouble la.y not 1A hi. abill tie., but in hi. "alue. and in the .ettillg 1D 
whioh he worked. t"'" a.at waa Roosevelt 80 guilt, here? lie qa, to ue a trite 
pbraae, a un of his times. H:1s errors were tbose of l'I6D1 1A a1II:1lar poei-
Uou of 1"eaporudbil1ty. Where he erred, u in Chin ... pol1oy, otbera would 
not baYe perhapal but, the1 might bave erred aad -.de aer10ua m1st.kee where 
he _de aoaAt. All in all then, one can well oall fheodore ROOMvelt tbe an 
ODieti. peaoHaker. ae did obtain peace, at l_t for awbile. but, he alao 
know1ngl., aet the .o.e tor the prox.t..ate OYe"thl"ov of the open door pollo, 
and he pa't'ed the w:t for the death ot the balaDce of power in the rar F .... t. 
Actual.l.1 the peece which llooeevelt III&Ilftyered 41d not eaUsf1 the interestea. 
perU .. but rather aatqoDiHd th_ and agravate4 all old and clanpl'OU8 inter-
Datioraal. at tuation. b.e an4 MIl1 other factor. haYe alreadJ' 'been dieouued 
'betore, and f.I'oaI the .. we can ... that 'l'he04ore RooseYelt va.a the peaoemaker, 
the Antagonistic Peaoemaker. 
\tUh this att.pted estimate of Rooseyelt 1n mind the next and f1nal 
qu .. tion ot this thesis ia reacbed-ot what a1p1ficance was Roosevelt's 
PoI'taouth work. Nt in evaluat1ng Rooa .. elt·s role at Port8llO\lth tbere were 
as maD.1 opin1ona as evaluators, 80 here the judgment. are aa varied .. those 
proffering th... lor 1natance, Dermis aa,ya. "'rhu ... we look on the treaty 
ot Portaaoutb, we find that 1t did not pl'OY1de a solution of the problema of . 
Far Eutern policy_ It mere11 detined them in a ne" lMUe and w1th tresh opo-
ponente.,,36 Latan( Rite.. "Surel1no ser1e. of eventa could be c1ted that 
would illustrate in • more dramatic W81 the tact that the old world orde" bad 
paaaed aVtq and that the .y.t. know •• the balanoe of POWI' in Europe, which 
bad hitherto dOlllinated the aftair. of this Slob., had been _perseded by a new 
world order. • •• ror a hundred years prior to the rise of Japan, we had the 
European balance with the Unit.d States as the only detached power.,,3? Now 
Japan had entered the picture in the world balance ot power. Dennett would 
combine Rooseyelt's general policy and his Portsmouth work. more than many 
others. to show the significance ot the latter: 
this was the big contribution ot President Rooseyelt to Far 
Eastern policy. 18 a precedent tor the future it was the largest 
contribution eyer made, worth a thousand diplomatic notes. It 
was not a permanent contribution, for it did not haYe the support 
ot the American people and the next AcJm1:rd.stration lapsed into 
the old traditional policy of expecting soaething tor nothing. ot 
standiq back until sOlIe other Power made the effort, and then de-
manding a share in the trui ts ot victory. This t howeyer. d.tracts 
nothing from the cr.dit ot Roosevelt for haYing don. his honest. 
aanl7. mod.st b.st. President Rooseyelt set the precedent in Amer-
ican history that the United States should pay for its privileges 
on the mainland of Aaia.,o : 
10 make broad. general statements about Roosevelt's initiating the Japa-
..... Am.rican hostility ot the tirst halt ot the twenti.th c.ntury is toolish. 
To accus. Theodore Roos"elt ot great intaJQ' or great success would be to con- li'l 
tradict the taots. Roos.vel t, guided by his ideas on policy. handled the si t-
ution as h. _" tit. Though the consequenc •• ot Portaaouth brought a nep-
tion. to a large d.gree. ot much ot Rooseyelt's policy. still many ot those 
couequences ".re in the raa.ki.J'1g long b.tor. Rooseyelt became the antagonistic 
peacemaker. 
37 John B. Latan(, ! Histoa 2! Am.rican Foreign Polioy, (Nev York, 1934), 
.563. 
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